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Abstract
We explore optimal and politically feasible growth policies in the form of
basic research investments and taxation. Basic research is a public good that
benefits innovating entrepreneurs, but its provision and financing also affect the
entire economy – in particular, occupational choices of potential entrepreneurs,
wages, dividends, and aggregate output. We show that the impact of basic re-
search on the general economy rationalizes a taxation pecking order to finance
basic research. More specifically, in a society with desirably dense entrepreneurial
activity, a large share of funds for basic research should be financed by labor tax-
ation, while a minor share should be left to profit taxation. Such tax schemes
will induce a significant proportion of agents to become entrepreneurs, thereby
rationalizing substantial investments in basic research that fosters their innova-
tion prospects. These entrepreneurial economies, however, may make a majority
of workers worse off, giving rise to a conflict between efficiency and equality.
We discuss ways of mitigating this conflict and thus strengthening the political
support for growth policies.
Keywords basic research · economic growth · entrepreneurship · income
taxation · political economy
JEL Classification D72 · H20 · H40 · O31 · O38
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1 Introduction
The contribution of innovative entrepreneurship to economic growth and the well-
being of societies has been a constant concern for policy-makers and is at the center
of policy debates on how to induce growth in the Eurozone (Economist, 2012). In this
paper, we will be examining two key drivers – basic research and taxation – that shape
entrepreneurial activities and growth, and that are prominent in academic and policy
debates.1 We will first derive optimal growth policies and then discuss their political
implementability.
Basic research is a sophisticated public good. The main beneficiaries are innovating
entrepreneurs: basic research improves their chances of developing new varieties or
new, less cost-intensive production technologies.2 At the same time, these innovating
entrepreneurs are needed for basic research investments to become effective: basic
research is embryonic in nature and only impacts indirectly on the economy via applied
research and commercialization. In this paper we ask how much of this public good
should be provided and how it should be financed. We further inquire whether optimal
policies can be politically implemented.
Providing and financing basic research is an intricate task. Taxation will not only help
to fund these investments, it will also impact on the entire economy through a variety
of feedback effects. In particular, basic research investments and tax policies jointly
impact on:
− the occupational choice of individuals to become entrepreneurs;
− wages earned by workers;
− dividends paid to shareholders by final-good producers;
− aggregate output.
We address these interdependencies in a general equilibrium framework. We develop a
1Cf. European Commission (2008), European Commission (2013), and General Secretariat of the
European Council (2010), for example. With the ambition to stimulate innovation and growth, the
European Union is aiming towards directing 3% of GDP to R&D by 2020, 1/3 of which is supposed to
be publicly funded (basic) research. The Netherlands, for example, have strengthened tax incentives
for entrepreneurship and innovation (Government of the Netherlands, 2010).
2The positive effect of basic research on applied research has been the subject of several studies
(cf. Gersbach et al. (2010) for a discussion of the literature). Link and Rees (1990) and Acs et al.
(1994) provide evidence suggesting that small firms may benefit particularly strongly from university
R&D.
2
simple model of creative destruction where a final consumption good is produced using
labor and a continuum of indivisible intermediate goods as inputs. Agents can either
work in the final-goods sector, in the intermediate-goods sector, as basic researchers,
or they can become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can benefit from basic research
provided by the government and invest in applied research to develop labor-saving
technologies for intermediates. Successful entrepreneurs will earn monopoly profits. In
addition, entrepreneurship has immaterial costs (such as entrepreneurial effort cost)
and benefits (such as initiative and social status). Potential entrepreneurs weigh these
costs and benefits against the labor income lost when deciding on whether or not to
become entrepreneurs. The government finances its basic research investments using a
combination of labor income, profit, and (potentially) lump-sum taxes. This financing
decision also affects the occupational choice made by potential entrepreneurs and hence
impacts on the effectiveness of basic research investments.
Results
Our first main insight is that financing basic research – a public good that impacts
the economy indirectly through various channels – rationalizes a taxation pecking or-
der. In particular, when innovations can potentially lead to labor savings that exceed
labor used for entrepreneurial activities and basic research, it is desirable to have an
innovative economy with dense entrepreneurial activities and basic research (called an
entrepreneurial economy). In an entrepreneurial economy, a large share of funds for
basic research should be financed by labor income taxation, while a minor share should
be left to profit taxation. The fact that tax rates on one source of income (here labor)
are higher than tax rates on another source (here profits) is called a taxation pecking
order. The pecking order – primarily reliant on labor income taxes – ultimately arises
from the complementarity of basic research investments and tax policies: the taxation
pecking order induces a significant share of agents to become entrepreneurs, thereby
increasing the benefits from investments in basic research.
However, labor-saving innovations lead to declining real wages so optimal policies in
an entrepreneurial economy will harm workers with little shareholdings. These dis-
tributional effects can give rise to a conflict between efficiency and equality that will
undermine political support for growth policies. To examine this conflict, we assume a
political economy perspective and analyze growth policies in a median voter framework.
We show that if shareholdings are skewed to the right the median voter may reject any
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growth-stimulating entrepreneurial policies. Then the society is ‘trapped’ in a stag-
nant economy. Furthermore, even if the median voter supports a growth-stimulating
entrepreneurial economy, her preferred basic research investments and tax policy will
be more moderate vis-à-vis the optimal growth policy. Importantly, we find that more
ambitious growth policies can be implemented when larger top tax rates are feasible.
Then tax incentives for entrepreneurs (efficiency) and the redistribution of gains from
innovation (equality) can be better aligned. Larger upper bounds on taxation allow
for more redistribution to the median voter, thus potentially satisfying equity concerns
and making growth policies politically feasible. At the same time, larger upper bounds
on tax rates allow more flexibility in the relationship between tax rates on labor in-
come and profits, which is decisive for entrepreneurship and innovation and hence for
efficiency concerns. We will illustrate the forces that determine the political feasibility
of entrepreneurial policies by means of a numerical example using OECD data.
Implications
As politically implementable basic research investments tend to be too low, our political
economy results provide a rationale for the surprisingly high rates of return to public
investments in (basic) research that are typically found in empirical studies.3
Moreover, the insights above may also have implications for two determinants of the
boundaries of tax rates: constitutional bounds and fiscal capacity. Constitutional
bounds to taxation are sometimes proposed as a means of protecting investors from
excessive indirect expropriation via tax policies.4 We show that while low upper tax
bounds do indeed protect firm-owners if growth policies are given, they may actually
3Cf. Salter and Martin (2001) for an overview of such studies and Toole (2012) for a more recent
example.
4Tax provisions are repeatedly at the center of constitutional court rulings, and in many countries
there are implicit tax bounds, which derive from constitutional principles of taxation. For example, in
Germany the Federal Constitutional Court’s ‘half-division principle’ (Halbteilungsgrundsatz) as ruled
in 1995 for the taxation of assets says that the overall tax load on after-tax assets (‘consolidated assets’)
must not exceed a 50 percent mark (BVerfGE 93:138) (von Arnauld and Zimmermann, 2013). And
the French constitutional court has stated that a total tax burden of 90.5% would not be admissible
(cf. Conseil Constitutionnel de la République Française, 2013). Supermajority rules for tax increases
are an alternative to bounds on tax rates. Several US states, for example, have such provisions, and
they have also been proposed at the federal level in the past (cf., for example, National Conference
of State Legislatures, 2010; Gradstein, 1999). An example for explicit constitutional tax bounds is
Switzerland where direct taxes at the federal level are restricted as follows: ‘The Confederation may
levy a direct tax: a. of a maximum of 11.5 per cent on the income of private individuals; b. of a
maximum of 8.5 per cent of the net profit of legal entities ’ (Article 128.1, Federal Constitution of the
Swiss Confederation).
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harm firm-owners if these growth policies are subject to the political process. Then
low upper bounds on taxation may undermine the political support for growth policies,
and the society may be ‘trapped’ in a stagnant economy with little entrepreneurship
and low profits. Indeed, we will argue that in a constitutional design phase behind the
veil of ignorance bounds on taxation are likely to be rejected.
Alternatively, tax bounds may implicitly arise from fiscal capacity, ‘economic insti-
tutions inherited from the past ’ (Besley and Persson, 2009, p. 1219) that determine
the government’s ability to collect taxes. Cross-country data indicate a strong posi-
tive relationship between fiscal capacity and GDP per capita. We provide a political
economy rationale explaining why weak fiscal institutions may harm growth prospects.
In a nutshell, weak fiscal institutions do not allow for sufficient redistribution to let a
critical mass of the population participate in gains from growth-stimulating policies.
Accordingly, they may undermine the political support needed for the implementation
of such policies.5
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 situates our paper in the literature. Sections
3 and 4 outline the model and derive the equilibrium for given tax policies and basic
research investments. In section 5 we analyze aggregate-consumption-optimal policies.
Section 6 presents an analysis of the political economy of financing basic research,
while section 7 discusses further implications of our main results. Finally, section 8
concludes. We provide some additional details on the political economy of financing
basic research in the appendix, and several robustness checks for our pecking order
result in the working-paper version of our paper (Gersbach et al., 2014). Also, all the
proofs are to be found in the appendix.
2 Literature
Our paper is related to several important strands in the literature.
5Weak fiscal institutions are typically associated with developing countries, which are also the
main focus of Besley and Persson (2009). However, industrialized economies may also suffer from
weak fiscal institutions. As an example, the European Commission (2012, p. 12) advances the view
that ‘currently Greece suffers from a lack of capacity to [...] collect taxes ’. While it is certainly
concerned about rebalancing Greek public finances, it is also concerned about the ‘fairness of the tax
system’ (p. 11) and about ensuring that the ‘burden of adjustment is fairly distributed ’ (p. 13).
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Effects of basic research and financing
In this paper, we start from the assumption that there is a need for public funding of
basic research.6 Our first main question is then how optimally chosen basic research
expenditures should be financed. Our paper is thus related to the literature on financing
productive government expenditures. In this literature, surveyed comprehensively by
Irmen and Kuehnel (2009), government expenditures increase the productivity of goods
production in the economy directly. By contrast, our model is rooted in the tradition of
R&D-based endogenous growth models, notably those that explicitly take into account
the hierarchical order of basic and applied research (see, for example, Arnold, 1997;
Morales, 2004; Gersbach et al., 2010). In these models, basic research has no productive
use in itself but rather fuels into the productivity of the applied research sector, where
knowledge is transformed into blueprints for new or improved products. In our case,
basic research affects the innovation probability of entrepreneurs engaging in applied
research. Using more public funds for basic research improves the chances of success
for private entrepreneurs at the cost of diverting resources away from intermediate-
and final-good production.
This implies that financing basic research has to fulfill a second important role. Sup-
pose basic research is financed via a combination of labor income, profit, and lump-sum
taxes. The relative size of labor to profit taxes affects the trade-off faced by poten-
tial entrepreneurs between being employed in the labor market and becoming an en-
trepreneur. Hence it influences the number of innovating entrepreneurs in our economy.
To sum up, a socially efficient financing scheme for basic research must simultaneously
provide the funds for these investments and must induce a socially desirable share of
agents to become entrepreneurs.
6The case for the public funding of basic research is well established in the literature, at least since
the seminal papers of Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) (cf. Gersbach et al. (2014) and Gersbach et al.
(2015) for a brief discussion of the main arguments). This rationale is also borne out by the empirical
evidence. Gersbach et al. (2013) report data showing that for a selection of 15 countries the average
share of basic research performed in the government and higher-education sector was approximately
75% in 2009. The OECD research and development statistics tell us that across OECD member
countries around 80% of total research performed in the government or higher-education sector is
also funded by the government (cf. Gersbach et al. (2015) for further details). Taken together, these
findings suggest that a major share of basic research investments are indeed publicly funded. This
evidence is also in line with US data on the source of funds for basic research, as reported in National
Science Board (2012, Table 4-3).
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Optimal taxation in an economy with entrepreneurship
We will analyze the optimal mix of basic research and tax policies. Accordingly, our
paper is also related to the literature on optimal income taxation in the tradition of
Mirrlees (1971). At the heart of our model is the occupational choice by (potential)
entrepreneurs. Boadway et al. (1991) present a model with heterogeneous agents who
can chose between becoming entrepreneurs or workers. While they restrict tax rates to
make them the same for both types of labor, in our model the government can distin-
guish between taxes on profits and taxes on labor income.7 Kanbur (1981) considers a
model with an endogenous occupational choice on the part of homogeneous agents be-
tween becoming a worker earning a safe wage and an entrepreneur earning risky profits.
While he considers entrepreneurial risk-taking under occupation-dependent taxation,
he does not derive optimal tax policies. In this regard, his work is close in nature to
calibrated dynamic general equilibrium models used to assess the effects of stylized tax
reforms (see, for example, Meh, 2005; Cagetti and De Nardi, 2009).
Moresi (1998) and Scheuer (2013) analyze optimal tax policies in models of asymmetric
information with occupational choice, where the government faces a trade-off between
efficiency and equality.8 The distinctive feature of our model is that we analyze optimal
tax policies and the investment of tax revenues in basic research. This means that the
government can simultaneously affect the share of entrepreneurs in an economy and
their innovativeness. We show that in such circumstances efficient policies make use
of a taxation pecking order. Notably, in our model investments in basic research that
allow for efficiency gains in aggregate should be accompanied by low profit taxes and
high labor income taxes.
7Allen (1982) had previously presented a model with two types of workers, skilled and unskilled,
who can choose between two types of labor. In his model, however, workers perfectly select into
these types of labor on the basis of their skill-group. In that sense, his model is closer in nature to
Feldstein (1973) and Stiglitz (1982), who consider optimal taxation with two types of workers but no
occupational choice. All of these papers also consider one tax instrument only.
8Haufler et al. (2012), for example, take a different viewpoint on optimal tax policies with en-
trepreneurship. They consider a model where entrepreneurs engage in risky innovation and endoge-
nously choose the quality (riskiness) of their project. Gains from innovation are subject to different
tax treatments, depending on whether the entrepreneur has entered the market or sold his project to
an incumbent. Optimal tax policies then trade off the gains from increased competition via market-
entry against the losses of reduced entrepreneurial risk-taking due to lost tax deductions in the case
of failure.
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Growth and tax policies in the political process
Growth policies can have important distributional effects. In the case of basic research
investments and taxation, these effects can be particularly pronounced. Our paper is
thus related to a large literature on the political feasibility of growth policies.
A classical benchmark on majority voting on linear income taxes as developed in Romer
(1975), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggests that if income distri-
bution is skewed to the right voting will result in inefficiently high tax rates. Persson
and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) were among the first to incorpo-
rate such politico-economic considerations into endogenous growth models. Accord-
ing to their models, increased inequality compromises long-run growth perspectives
via stronger redistributive taxation. Both papers present empirical evidence support-
ing this main finding. We consider an R&D-based growth model as opposed to an
investment-based growth model. As in Alesina and Rodrik (1994), the government can
engage in productive government expenditures which, however, only affect the economy
indirectly via innovating entrepreneurs. We show that in our model greater inequality
also hinders growth-stimulating policies. However, this conflict of interests between
growth policies and redistribution can be resolved if (constitutional) tax bounds are
sufficiently flexible. The intuition is that tax policies impact indirectly on economic
growth via the occupational choice of potential entrepreneurs, which is shaped by rel-
ative, rather than by absolute tax rates.
Our main results have a series of other interesting implications. Among others, they
relate to the literature on constitutional design for tax policies and on fiscal capacity.
We detail these implications and the associated literature in section 7.
3 The model
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure L̄ > 1. Households
derive utility u(c) = c from a final consumption good. Each household either inelasti-
cally supplies one unit of homogeneous labor or chooses to become an entrepreneur, as
shown below. Households are indexed by k (k ∈ [0, L̄]).
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3.1 Production
The final good, y, is produced with a continuum of intermediate goods x(i) (i ∈ [0, 1]).
The production technology is given by:
y = L1−αy
∫ 1
0
x(i)α di , (1)
where Ly denotes the labor employed in final-good production and where 0 < α < 1.
The final good is only used for consumption, hence in equilibrium the output of the
final good equals aggregate consumption C, i.e. C = y.
We assume that intermediate goods x are indivisible, i.e. x(i) is either 1 or 0.9 The
final good is chosen as the numéraire with its price normalized to 1. Firms in the
final-good sector operate under perfect competition. They take the price p(i) of in-
termediate goods as given. In the following, we work with a representative final-good
firm maximizing its profits πy:
πy = y −
∫ 1
0
p(i)x(i) di− wLy (2)
by choosing the quantities x(i) ∈ {0, 1} and the amount of labor Ly. The variable w
denotes the wage prevailing in the market for labor. If the final-good producer chooses
x(i) = 1 for all i, the demand for labor in final-good production will be:10
Ly =
(
1− α
w
)
1
α
. (3)
3.2 Behavior of intermediate-good producers
Each intermediate good can be produced by a given standard technology using m > 0
units of labor. Hence, marginal production costs when using the standard technology
9As we explain in more detail later, we consider the case of labor-saving technological progress
in the intermediate-good sector. With indivisible intermediate goods, labor saved in intermediates
production is not taken up elsewhere in the economy at constant wages. This can give rise to a stark
conflict of interest between equality and efficiency and hence to political conflicts in our economy.
We discuss these in detail in section 6. Three remarks are in order at this stage: first, our finding
of the optimality of a taxation pecking order relies neither on labor-saving technological innovation
nor on the indivisibility of intermediates. It follows rather from the complementarity of basic research
and the occupational choice of potential entrepreneurs. Second, we believe that the conflict between
equality and efficiency in our economy is broadly in line with the decreasing shares of labor income in
aggregate income, in particular for low-skilled labor, that can be observed in the EU and the US (cf.
footnote 44). And third, while the indivisibility of intermediates can accentuate the equality-efficiency
trade-off in our economy, it is not necessary for such effects to arise (cf. footnote 45).
10We will show that x(i) = 1 ∀ i indeed holds in the unique equilibrium with positive production.
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aremw. We assume that the standard technology is freely available. If an entrepreneur
engages in research and development and successfully innovates, the labor input per
unit of the respective intermediate good declines by a factor γ (γ < 1), leading to
marginal production costs of γmw for this good. The innovating entrepreneur obtains
a monopoly and offers his unit of the intermediate good at a price equal to the marginal
cost of potential competitors, mw, thereby gaining profit πxm = (1− γ)mw.
11,12 If no
innovation takes place, Bertrand competition yields an equilibrium price of mw as well,
implying zero profits for all producers of the intermediate good under consideration.13
Our set-up involves distributional conflicts regarding the desirability of labor-saving
innovations. The innovative entrepreneur possesses the market power to reap the entire
direct benefit of innovation while the final good firm benefits indirectly through lower
wages leading to higher output and profits. Workers are harmed as wages decline.
Our set-up is partly motivated by declining labor shares in aggregate income (Timmer
et al., 2010; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014) and the literature relating this trend to
innovations that replace low-skilled labor (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2016, 2017; Hemous
and Olson, 2014).14 If innovation rents were shared more broadly, for example, by
directly increasing consumer surplus, the redistributional conflict may weaken but will
11We refer to the process of innovative entrepreneurs capturing the market for the respective in-
termediate good with a new technology as creative destruction. Creative destruction is often used in
the context of the innovator destroying the profits of an incumbent. The small difference in our case
is that the market for the old technology is destroyed, but no profits, as the old technology is freely
available. We discuss the political economy implications of introducing incumbents’ profits in section
7.
12While the model is static, for an interpretation in a dynamic context we assume that a new
innovative technology becomes publicly available for use after one period. This means that patents
expire after one period or, if secrecy protects the monopoly rents, that the technological knowledge
will spill over after one period.
13As we explain in section 3.3, we consider the case of no duplication of research efforts implying
that there will be at most one successful innovator for each intermediate good. Note that there would
also be only one successful innovator if we allowed for patent races as in this case the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium would be such that upon successful innovation by one entrepreneur any competing
entrepreneur would immediately terminate his R&D efforts anticipating that Bertrand competition
among successful entrepreneurs would eliminate profits. Patents or secrecy then result in monopoly
power of the innovative entrepreneur. Therefore, there is no competition pushing prices down to the
marginal production costs under the new technology γmw. Intermediate good producers with the
old technology are driven out of the market by the innovative entrant via limit pricing, similar to
a set-up with divisible intermediate goods but non-drastic innovation (cf. footnote 45). However, if
there is no successful innovation on the production of an intermediate good, Bertrand competition
will ensue as the final good producer demands exactly one unit of the intermediate good and the old
technology is not protected from use. This yields a price equal to marginal costs and zero profits in the
intermediate sectors without innovation. At a more general level, this resembles the characteristics of
perfectly competitive markets that would be the natural outcome in intermediate good sectors without
innovation if the intermediate goods were divisible.
14We discuss this point further in footnote 44.
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not disappear unless wages increase from innovation as well. On the other hand, there
may exist even stronger distributional conflicts if incumbent intermediate firms can
earn positive profits. We will allow for varying degrees of distributional conflicts in our
political economy analysis by letting the median voter own a fraction s of final good
producers’ profits, and will discuss an extension with positive incumbents’ profits in
section 7. We note that if the tax system is able to support entrepreneurial policies
in the set-up studied in this paper, it will also be possible in situations with more
moderate distributional conflicts.
3.3 Innovation
There is a subset of individuals with measure 1, [0, 1] ⊂ [0, L̄], who are potential
entrepreneurs. Individuals face different costs and benefits when deciding to become
an entrepreneur. Specifically, we assume that agents are ordered in [0, 1] according
to their immaterial utilities from entrepreneurial activities and where individual k
faces the utility factor λk = (1 − k)b (k ∈ [0, 1], b being a positive parameter). This
factor rescales the profit earned from entrepreneurial activities to take into account
immaterial costs (such as cost from exerting effort as an entrepreneur or utility cost
from entrepreneurial risk-taking that are not reflected in the utility from consumption)
and immaterial benefits (such as excitement, initiative, or social status) associated with
entrepreneurial activity.15,16 Agents with a higher index k have lower utility factors.
A utility factor λk < 1 represents net immaterial cost of being an entrepreneur, while
factor λk > 1 represents net immaterial benefits.
17 For individuals k with λk = 1, and
thus k = 1− 1
b
, immaterial costs and benefits associated with entrepreneurial activities
cancel out. We define kcrit = max
{
1− 1
b
, 0
}
. If b is small and hence kcrit is small
or even zero, the society is characterized by a population of potential entrepreneurs
for whom effort costs matter most. If b is large and hence kcrit is large, the potential
entrepreneurs enjoy being one compared to a worker. We assume that λk is private
15We use a multiplicative rather than an additive form to capture costs and benefits from en-
trepreneurship. A detailed rationale will be provided in footnote 30.
16Cf. footnote 31 for a discussion on how differences in risk-attitudes may give rise to occupational
choice effects similar to the ones arising from our immaterial benefit factor λk.
17Our concept of immaterial utilities associated with being an entrepreneur is in line with empirical
evidence (cf. Douglas and Shepherd, 2000; Hamilton, 2000; Praag and Versloot, 2007; Benz and
Frey, 2008; Benz, 2009; Fuchs-Schündeln, 2009). Most studies find that entrepreneurship involves
positive non-monetary benefits. Fuchs-Schündeln (2009) shows that there is heterogeneity across the
population in such immaterial utilities and that they may be negative for some households.
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information and hence only observed by agent k.18
The chances of entrepreneurs of successfully innovating can be fostered by basic re-
search. Basic research generates knowledge that can be taken up by entrepreneurs
and transformed into innovations that improve their production process. Specifically,
suppose that the government employs LB (0 ≤ LB ≤ L̄) researchers in basic research.
Then the probability that an entrepreneur will successfully innovate is given by η(LB),
where η(LB) fulfils η(0) ≥ 0, η
′(·) > 0, η′′(·) < 0 and η(L̄) ≤ 1.19 Depending on
whether η(0) = 0 or η(0) > 0, basic research is a necessary condition for innovation or
not.
Accordingly, if a subset of measure LE of the population decided to become en-
trepreneurs and the probability of success for each of them was η(LB), the share of
intermediate-good industries with successful innovation would be equal to η(LB)LE ,
and the aggregate labor saved through innovations in the intermediate good sector is
given by χ(LB)LE , where:
20
χ(LB) := η(LB)m(1− γ) . (4)
This is illustrated in Figure 1a), which depicts the amount of labor employed in in-
termediate good production by the successfully innovating entrepreneurs and by those
producing with the old technology. The shaded area reflects the total amount of labor
saved through innovations in the intermediate good sector. We note that property
LE ≤ 1 enables entrepreneurs to perform research on a variety of the intermediate
good different from others.21
18This does preclude conditioning taxation on λk. We note that if λk is common knowledge but tax
policies do not condition thereon our results will remain unaffected.
19η′(·) and η′′(·) denote the first and second derivative, respectively, of η(·) with respect to LB.
20We can apply the law of large numbers to a continuum of random variables as e.g. developed by
Uhlig (1996).
21Strictly speaking, we assume that there is no duplication of research efforts. If research duplication
is included in the model as a purely wasteful activity, formulations in which several researchers compete
for innovation on one variety would imply decreasing benefits from basic research for entrepreneurs
and for the society. Next to being a purely wasteful activity, increased competition among applied or
basic researchers could reduce the expected time for new research results or patents to be produced.
If several research teams work on similar topics, they may also produce some complementary results.
In this way, there is a trade-off between some wasteful research duplication and competition. It
ultimately depends on the precise costs and benefits whether competition may be beneficial. With
respect to basic research, for example, the government would certainly not fund several Large Hadron
Colliders, but might be willing to give research grants to several groups of economists working on
optimal tax policy and economic growth.
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Figure 1: Labor saving innovation in intermediate good sector and wage response
a) Labor savings through innovation b) Wage response to innovation
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3.4 Financing scheme
Public expenditures on basic research are financed by taxes. There are many reasons
why basic research should be – and actually is, to a large extent – publicly funded.22
One of them is its public-good characteristics, together with the non-patentability of
basic research. This is the reason for public financing of basic research in our model.
While entrepreneurs could, in principle, invest in basic research, they have no incentive
to do so as their influence on the aggregate amount of basic research, which determines
their innovation probability, is negligible.23 There are two sources of income on which
the government can levy taxes: labor income or profits (in intermediate- and final-
good production). We consider two scenarios involving lump-sum taxation. In our
base case, we assume that the government can levy lump-sum taxes or make lump-
sum transfers.24 In the working-paper version of our paper (Gersbach et al., 2014),
we examine the case where this is not possible. A tax scheme is a vector (tL, tP , tH)
where tL and tP are the tax rates on labor income and on profits, respectively, and tH
denotes the lump-sum tax or transfer. We assume that there are upper bounds (and
potentially lower bounds) for labor income and profit taxes. Upper bounds on taxation
may either be specified explicitly in the constitution or they may arise implicitly from
22We provided reasons for public funding of basic research in footnote 6.
23Technically speaking the impact is zero, as an individual entrepreneur is of measure zero in the
continuum of entrepreneurs.
24Our model allows for unsuccessful entrepreneurs earning zero profits. Consequently, if their share
of the profits of the final-good firm are not too high, they may not be able to pay the lump-sum
tax. For a broad range of parameter values, lump-sum taxes are negative in optimum, implying that
this is not an issue. If not, we assume that all individuals have a certain endowment that could be
drawn upon by the government in this case. Moreover, we will be examining the case where lump-sum
taxation is not feasible.
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fiscal capacities in the spirit of Besley and Persson (2009), for example.25 We denote
the upper and lower bounds by tj and tj, j ∈ {L, P}, respectively.
26 For our theoretical
analysis we assume that the upper bounds are strictly smaller than 1, i.e. tj ≤ 1 − ε
for some arbitrarily small ε > 0.27
The government is free to set the tax rates within these bounds, however, we assume
that it needs to run a balanced budget, i.e. the government budget constraint is given
by:
wLB = tL(L̄− LE)w + tP (πy + η(LB)LEπxm) + tH L̄ , (5)
where tH = 0 in the scenario without lump-sum taxes.
28
3.5 Sequence of events
We summarize the sequence of events as follows:
(1) The government hires a number LB of researchers to provide public basic research
25Alternatively, upper bounds on tax rates may implicitly arise from harmful supply-side effects
of taxation: supply effects of profit taxes are at the very heart of the analysis pursued here. Yet
in an open economy, the government may also be confronted with additional harmful supply effects
associated with high profit taxes that are not considered here and that may give rise to effective
upper bounds on profit taxes. Similarly, supply effects of labor income taxes are only considered to
the extent to which they affect the occupational choice by potential entrepreneurs. In addition, labor
income taxes may affect the labor/leisure choice of workers and hence be effectively bound from above.
26Lower bounds on profit taxes, in particular, may be demanded by the international community.
The European Council of Economics and Finance Ministers, for example, has agreed upon a code of
conduct for business taxation that is intended to tackle harmful competition in the field of business
taxation (European Union, 1998). Although this code of conduct does not explicitly define lower
bounds on taxation and is not legally binding, it still represents a considerable political commitment
not to have extremely low tax rates on profits.
27We choose ε > 0, as tax rates of 100% are economically implausible and to avoid dealing with
τ := 1−tP1−tL = ∞, which will feature prominently in our subsequent analyses. Note, however, that our
formal results do not depend on ε being positive.
28We assume that the tax bounds are exogenous to the government, since the sources such as the
quality of tax institutions, constitutional bounds, limits to taxation arising from Laffer curve effects,
or international tax competition are taken as given. Tax bounds may be endogenous at least in the
long run, potentially giving rise to commitment problems for governments who might be tempted
to attract entrepreneurs by promising strong tax incentives and to ex-post tax away the innovation
gains to benefit the majority of their electorate. While such time-inconsistency problems can be
a serious obstacle to foster an entrepreneurial economy, they may be less relevant in practice for
at least three reasons. First, if tax bounds are enforced by independent constitutional courts, the
government cannot quickly affect such decisions. Second, exploiting current entrepreneurs by high
profit taxes simultaneously destroys the incentives of the next generation to become entrepreneurs,
and thus turns an entrepreneurial economy into a stagnant one. As long as the future is sufficiently
important, a government would refrain from imposing high profit tax rates. Third, any potential
bounds arising from Laffer curve effects or international tax competition are mostly exogenous to
national governments also in the long-run.
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and chooses a financing scheme.
(2) A share LE of the population decide to become entrepreneurs. With probability
η(LB) they will successfully innovate, which enables them to capture monopoly
rents. A share (1− η(LB))LE will not be successful and will earn zero profits.
(3) Each intermediate-good firm i hires a number Lx(i) of workers to produce the
intermediate good x(i).
(4) The representative final-good firm buys the intermediate goods x(i) at a price
p(i) and produces the homogeneous final good y.
4 Equilibrium for given policies
In this section we derive the equilibrium for a given amount of basic research and a
given financing scheme.
4.1 Occupational choice by potential entrepreneurs
We first address the choice of occupation. Potential entrepreneurs, i.e. agents in the
interval [0, 1], can choose between (a) employment as workers and (b) the attempt to
develop an innovation to be used in the production of intermediate goods. We are left
with two cases: all agents choose to be workers or both occupations are chosen in equi-
librium. If both occupations are chosen in equilibrium, the marginal entrepreneur has
to be indifferent between being employed as a worker and becoming an entrepreneur.
The expected net profit of an entrepreneur who sells x(i) = 1 is:
πE = (1− tP )η(LB)πxm = (1− tP )wη(LB)m(1− γ) .
The last expression indicates that the expected profit of the entrepreneur consists of
the expected amount of labor saved in intermediate-good production:
χ(LB) := η(LB)m(1− γ) ,
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scaled by the wage rate net of profit taxes.29 Hence the expected utility for an individual
k with (dis-)utility factor λk = (1− k)b from being an entrepreneur is:
30
EUE(k) = (1− tP )wχ(LB)(1− k)b .
If EUE(k) = (1 − tL)w, the individual is indifferent between being employed as a
worker and becoming an entrepreneur. Solving for the indifferent entrepreneur’s index
k yields the equilibrium amount of entrepreneurs denoted by LeE as:
31
LeE = max
{
0; 1−
1− tL
1− tP
1
χ(LB)b
}
. (6)
We note that LeE is independent of the wage level. Higher wages are associated with
higher profits from entrepreneurship and, of course, imply higher labor income. In the
following we use:
τ :=
1− tP
1− tL
(7)
as an abbreviation for 1−tP
1−tL
, with the upper and lower bounds of τ denoted by τ and τ
being defined by the respective bounds of tL and tP . τ is a measure of tax incentives
29The total profits by the entrepreneurs are implicitly captured by the shaded area in Figure 1a),
which reflects the total amount of labor-saving by innovation in the intermediate good sector. Multi-
plying the size of this area by the wage rate w therefore yields the entrepreneurs’ profits.
30Note that we have chosen a multiplicative functional form. An alternative approach is to use an
additive functional form by deducting the cost (see, for example, Boadway et al., 1991; Scheuer, 2013).
The multiplicative approach is more convenient and analytically much easier. In addition, it implies
that the net immaterial benefit is scaled by entrepreneurial profits. The multiplicative approach may
therefore be more appropriate in reflecting effort costs and social status benefits, in particular, as
these would typically be related to profits. For λk < 1 the effort costs dominate, while for λk > 1 the
social status benefits dominate. Qualitatively, however, the additive and the multiplicative approach
involve the same trade-offs and pecking-order considerations.
31In our model potential entrepreneurs differ in their immaterial costs and benefits from being an
entrepreneur. Agents whose expected utility from being an entrepreneur exceeds the utility from
working in the labor market opt to become entrepreneurs. We note that a similar result for the
occupational choice would arise if agents differed in their risk attitude rather than in an extra (dis-)
utility term. Suppose, for example, that potential entrepreneurs differ only in their degree of constant
relative risk-aversion with uk(c) =
c(1−rk)
1−rk
, where rk is distributed according to some continuous and
differentiable distribution function Frk(rk) on [0, 1) satisfying Frk(0) = 0 and
dFrk (·)
drk
> 0, ∀ rk ∈ [0, 1).
Suppose further that insurance against entrepreneurial risks is not possible. Then individual k opts
to become an entrepreneur if his certainty equivalent from being an entrepreneur is at least as large as
his after-tax wage: [η(LB)]
1
1−rk (1− tP )m(1−γ)w ≥ (1− tL)w for the case of no other income. Now, if
(1− tP )m(1−γ) ≤ 1− tL, the after tax profit of a successful entrepreneur is smaller than his after tax
wage, implying that there will always be 0 entrepreneurship in equilibrium. Suppose, by contrast, that
(1−tP )m(1−γ) > 1−tL. Then all potential entrepreneurs with rk ≤ 1−
ln(η(LB))
ln(1−tL)−ln((1−tP )m(1−γ))
will
become entrepreneurs and the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs is given by LE = Frk
(
rcrit
)
, where
rcrit = max
{
0; 1− ln(η(LB))ln(1−tL)−ln((1−tP )m(1−γ))
}
. As for the case with heterogeneous immaterial costs
and benefits from being an entrepreneur, entrepreneurship is increasing in m, tL, and LB, decreasing
in tP and γ, and independent of w. However, basic research has an additional effect here. Besides
increasing the expected profit from being an entrepreneur, it affects associated entrepreneurial risks.
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given to (potential) entrepreneurs.32 Moreover, let τ ≥ 1 ≥ τ , implying that a neutral
tax policy tL = tP is always possible.
Knowing LeE from (6), we obtain the amount of labor employed in the production of
intermediates as:
Lex =
∫ 1
0
Lx(i)di = m− χ(LB)L
e
E , (8)
if x(i) = 1 ∀ i. This corresponds to the amount of labor necessary to produce the
intermediate goods with standard technology less the (expected) amount of labor saved
by the new technologies invented by the entrepreneurs.
4.2 Equilibrium for given basic research and financing scheme
We will now characterize the equilibrium for given basic research and given tax policy.
Due to the indivisibility of the different varieties of the intermediate goods, we have
to consider the case where despite diminishing returns to intermediate goods in final-
good production, the final-good firm will not use all the different varieties or may even
go out of business and not produce at all. In appendix B.1, we show that in any
equilibrium with positive production in the final-good sector, the final-good producer
will use all varieties of intermediate goods and intermediate-good producers supplying
their product will charge p(i) = mw.
Naturally, a positive level of production in the final good sector will only occur if profits
are non-negative.33 This depends on the particular governmental policy (LB, τ) and we
32Empirical evidence in the literature suggests that the tax structure does indeed influence the level
of entrepreneurial activities in an economy. Using cross-sectional data from US personal income tax
returns, Cullen and Gordon (2007) estimate the impact of various tax measures on entrepreneurial
risk-taking as proxied by an indicator variable for whether or not an individual reports business
losses greater than 10% of reported wage income. They find that a cut in personal income tax rates
significantly reduces entrepreneurial risk-taking. The evidence for a cut in corporate tax rates is
less clear. Depending on the model specification used, such a cut is predicted to either raise or not
significantly affect entrepreneurial risk-taking. As the risk-sharing of non-diversifiable entrepreneurial
risks with the government is positively related to the corporate income tax rate, Cullen and Gordon
interpret their results as being in line with their theory. Djankov et al. (2010) analyze cross-country
data for 85 countries. They find that higher effective tax rates paid by a hypothetical new company
have a significantly adverse effect on aggregate investment and entrepreneurship. Da Rin et al. (2011)
find that corporate income taxes significantly reduce firm entry in a panel of 17 European countries.
Gentry and Hubbard (2000) analyze 1979 to 1992 data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics
and find that less progressive tax rates significantly increase entrepreneurship.
33As the final-good producer always uses one unit of each intermediate, the cost of intermediates
are essentially a fixed cost, which is increasing in we. If wages are too high (Ley is too low), then the
variable profits from operations are not large enough to compensate for these fixed costs.
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provide the precise Positive Profit Condition in appendix B.1.34 We need to distinguish
the different cases in the equilibrium characterization.
Proposition 1
(i) If LB and τ allow for positive profits of the final-good producer, there is a unique
equilibrium with xe(i) = 1 ∀ i and:
(1) LeE = max
{
0; 1− 1
τχ(LB)b
}
(2) Lex = m− χ(LB)L
e
E
(3) Ley = L̄− LB −m+ L
e
E [χ(LB)− 1]
(4) we = (1− α)
(
Ley
)−α
(5) pe(i) = m(1− α)
(
Ley
)−α
∀ i
(6) ye =
(
Ley
)1−α
(7) πey =
(
Ley
)−α (
αLey −m(1− α)
)
(8) πexm = (1− γ)m(1− α)(L
e
y)
−α
(ii) If LB and τ do not allow for positive profits of the final-good producer, there is a
unique equilibrium with xe(i) = 0 ∀ i, LeE = L
e
x = L
e
y = 0, zero output, and zero
profits.
In appendix B.1, we derive the Positive Profit Condition regarding governmental policy
(τ, LB) and provide the proof of Proposition 1. In the remainder of the paper, we
will use the equilibrium of Proposition 1, and simplify the notation by disposing of
superscript e in all expressions. We will focus on case (i) of Proposition 1, in which
the economic activities are viable. In particular, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1
L̄ ≥ m
α
Assumption 1 ensures that any aggregate-consumption-optimal policy (tL, tP , tH , LB)
will yield an equilibrium with positive final-good production. As we show in the next
section, the aim of the government’s basic research and tax policies boils down to
maximizing the amount of labor available for final-good production. As a consequence,
if some feasible policy choice satisfies the Positive Profit Condition, then so does the
optimal policy choice. Assumption 1 guarantees that there will be non-negative profits
34This condition depends only on parameters of the model and on government policy.
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in a stagnant economy with zero basic research and innovation and it therefore allows
us to neglect the Positive Profit Condition in the government’s optimization problem.35
5 Optimal growth policies
The government can affect the previously established equilibrium outcomes by invest-
ing in basic research and via the tax scheme. We begin our discussion of optimal growth
policies with some preliminary considerations before turning to the government’s max-
imization problem.
5.1 Preliminary considerations
Note that before taxes, the expected profit of an entrepreneur is higher than the wage
rate in goods production if χ(LB) ≥ 1. That is, by entrepreneurial activity, the individ-
ual saves in expectation more labor in intermediate-good production than the unit of
labor he could provide the labor market with himself. However, even if entrepreneurship
had a negative impact on labor supply in final-good production and hence on output
(i.e. if χ(LB) < 1), individuals may find it worthwhile to become entrepreneurs due to
immaterial benefits and tax policy τ . To allow for both corner and interior solutions
for entrepreneurship and output-increasing and output-decreasing entrepreneurship,
we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2
(i) χ(0) < 1 (ii) 1/τ < b ≤ 1/χ(0)
Assumption 2(i) states that, in expectation, entrepreneurship will reduce the labor sup-
ply for final-good production and thus final output when no basic research is provided.
The second inequality in (ii) enables the government to preclude output-reducing en-
trepreneurship by implementing a neutral tax policy and not investing in basic research.
That is, the government can fully suppress entrepreneurship by choosing LB = 0 and
τ = 1. By contrast, the first inequality in (ii) ensures that in the situation with output-
increasing entrepreneurship, the government will be able to induce a positive measure
of individuals to become entrepreneurs via its tax policy.
35Assumption 2(ii) below will guarantee that such a stagnant economy is always feasible.
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We now derive optimal policies when lump-sum taxes or lump-sum transfers are avail-
able to the government. As the number of entrepreneurs only depends on the relation
between profit and labor income taxes as captured by τ , the assumption of lump-sum
transfers enables us to separate the choice of LB from the choice of the government’s
tax incentives to (potential) entrepreneurs.36 If no lump-sum taxes and transfers are
available, the choices of τ and LB cannot be separated in all cases. We discuss these
issues in the appendix of the working-paper version of our paper (Gersbach et al., 2014)
and leave out of account such problems in the next section.
5.2 Optimal growth policy
We focus on a government seeking to maximize material welfare.37 The government’s
problem boils down to maximizing aggregate consumption, C, by choosing the amount
of basic research, LB, and the optimal ratio between profit and labor taxes, τ , while
either levying an additional lump-sum tax if labor and profit taxes satisfying optimal
τ do not suffice to finance the desired amount of LB or making a lump-sum transfer
in the case of the revenue generated by τ being larger than required for basic research
expenditures:
max
{tL,tP ,tH ,LB}
C =πy + η(LB)LEπxm + wLy + wLx + wLB − (L̄− LE)wtL
− tP [πy + η(LB)LEπxm]− tH L̄
s.t. wLB =(L̄− LE)wtL + tP [πy + η(LB)LEπxm] + tHL̄ .
36Given that basic research investments account for a share of government expenditures only, the
scenario with lump-sum taxes may also be interpreted as one where any excess funds are used to
finance other government expenditures that benefit all members of the population equally. For a
broad range of parameter values, lump-sum taxes are negative in optimum, i.e. we have lump-sum
transfers. Then our analysis is equivalent to an analysis with no lump-sum taxes but investments in
an additional public good g that can be produced by a one-to-one transformation of the consumption
good and enters households’ utilities as follows: u(c, g) = c+ g
L̄
.
37In the working-paper version of our paper (Gersbach et al., 2014), we consider the case where
the government’s objective additionally includes the immaterial welfare component, the entrepreneurs’
(dis-)utility from being an entrepreneur. We show that our main insight regarding the taxation pecking
order prevails and may be reinforced with the broader welfare measure that additionally accounts for
the utility costs and benefits from becoming an entrepreneur. The scenario where the government
only considers material welfare is arguably more realistic, as the utility from being an entrepreneur
cannot be observed directly by the government. Moreover, it is the key benchmark for our subsequent
political economy analysis.
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Inserting the constraint into the objective function and using the aggregate income
identity y = πy + η(LB)LEπxm + wLy + wLx reduces the problem to:
max
{τ,LB}
C(τ, LB) = y(τ, LB) = (Ly(τ, LB))
1−α
=
[
L̄− LE(τ, LB)− LB − Lx(τ, LB)
]1−α
.
Hence the objective of the government is to maximize the amount of productive labor
in final-good production. By inserting Lx, the objective function can be written as:
y(τ, LB) =
[
L̄− LB −m+ LE [χ(LB)− 1]
]1−α
. (9)
Maximizing (9) is equivalent to maximizing Ly = L̄−LB −m+LE [χ(LB)− 1], which
we will use in the following. Figure 1 illustrates the underlying trade-off: Higher basic
research expenditures (LB) and higher tax incentives for entrepreneurship (τ), on the
one hand, reduce Ly by increasing LB and LE [see Figure 1 b)] and, on the other hand,
increase Ly by decreasing Lx via labor saving innovation [shaded area in Figure 1a)].
Consequently, the governmemt will only increase LB and τ if justified by the additional
labor savings in the intermediate good sector.
It will be useful and informative to solve the government’s problem in two steps. First,
we determine the optimal tax policy to finance a given amount of basic research. In the
second step, we use the optimal tax policy to derive optimal basic research investments.
In the first step of optimization, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to the optimal
tax policy are:
∂LE
∂τ
[χ(LB)− 1](τ − τ ) ≥ 0 , (10a)
∂LE
∂τ
[χ(LB)− 1](τ − τ) ≤ 0 , (10b)
∂Ly
∂τ
(τ − τ)(τ − τ ) = 0 . (10c)
The term in brackets on the left-hand side of (10a) and (10b) expresses how much
labor in intermediate-good production will be saved in expectation by an additional
entrepreneur. We also observe in (10a) and (10b) that the expected benefit of another
entrepreneur depends on the level of basic research expenditures. For example, if
η(0) ≈ 0 implying χ(0) ≈ 0, an entrepreneur is not as productive in innovating as
when working in final-good production. From the definition of χ(LB) (see equation
(4)), we observe that only if the amount of basic research is larger than LB,min :=
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max {0, η−1 (1/ [m(1− γ)])}, where η−1(·) denotes the inverse of η(·), will an increase
in entrepreneurship be favorable for aggregate consumption.38 Note that from (6) ∂LE
∂τ
is non-negative and with LB ≥ LB,min strictly positive for τ in the neighborhood of
τ according to Assumption 2. Consequently, if LB > LB,min, the government benefits
from increasing τ to its maximum to make entrepreneurship as attractive as possible.
The opposite is the case if LB < LB,min. Then the government will aim at reducing
the number of entrepreneurs to a minimum by setting τ at its lowest level.39 The
government’s tax policy is indeterminate when LB = LB,min, and we assume that in
this case it will set τ = τ . Taken together, a strong version of a taxation pecking order
is optimal where tax rates are located at opposing bounds of their respective feasible
sets.
We summarize our findings in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (Taxation Pecking Order)
For a given amount of basic research, LB, the government levies taxes according to:
τ =
{
τ if LB ≥ LB,min
τ if LB < LB,min
. (11)
We now determine the optimal basic research investments in the second step of the
government’s optimization problem. Given Proposition 2, we can split the maximiza-
tion problem at the second step into one where LB is constrained on LB ≥ LB,min and
another for LB < LB,min. The first problem is:
max
{LB≥LB,min}
C(τ, LB) = y(τ, LB)
s.t. τ = τ ,
38Note that η−1(·) exists since η′ > 0 and that LB,min is positive by Assumption 2(i), stating that
without basic research the entrepreneurs are not as productive in producing labor-saving innovations
as in working in final-good production. This assumption is not necessary for our results in section 5.
With χ(0) ≥ 1, the government would always choose a tax policy τ = τ and basic research investments,
if positive, will strictly increase the number of entrepreneurs further. This is due to the fact that by
our specification of the immaterial utility component of entrepreneurship, the corner solution LE = 1
is precluded.
39Note that for LB < LB,min, there are typically multiple tax policies that entirely discourage
entrepreneurship. For instance, by Assumption 2(ii), for LB = 0 the government is indifferent be-
tween any tax policies (tL, tP ) satisfying τ ∈ [τ , 1]. For simplicity we assume that in such cases the
government will implement τ , i.e. tL = tL, tP = tP .
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which yields the necessary conditions for a maximum:
∂LE(LB, τ)
∂LB
[χ(LB)− 1] + LE(LB, τ)χ
′(LB)− 1 ≤ 0 , (12a)
∂Ly(LB, τ)
∂LB
(LB − LB,min) = 0 . (12b)
Marginally increasing basic research investments has three different effects on final-good
production. First, it improves the innovation prospects of the pool of entrepreneurs
as reflected by the second term in equation (12a). Second, the increase in innovation
prospects attracts additional entrepreneurs as reflected in the first term of equation
(12a). Note that since LB ≥ LB,min (and hence χ(LB) ≥ 1), this rise in entrepreneur-
ship increases final-good production. The optimal choice of LB trades off these gains
from investments in basic research against the loss of the marginal unit of labor used
in basic research rather than in final-good production, which is the third effect. This
marginal labor cost of basic research is reflected by the last term −1 in equation (12a).
We use L̃B(τ) to denote the solution of this constrained maximization problem. Note
that if L̃B(τ ) > LB,min, it will satisfy (12a) with equality.
With respect to the maximization problem constrained by LB < LB,min with associated
tax policy τ = τ , we can directly infer that the solution will be L̃B(τ ) = 0. The reason
is that basic research affects consumption only by improving the success probabilities
of entrepreneurs. However, for all LB < LB,min, entrepreneurship will negatively affect
final output and by Assumption 2 the government will be able to deter such inefficient
entrepreneurship by not providing basic research.
Overall, the government decides between implementing the policies (L̃B(τ ), τ) or (0, τ).
In the first situation, with positive basic research and entrepreneurship, we speak of an
entrepreneurial economy. The second situation without basic research investments and
entrepreneurship is called a stagnant economy. The government will implement the
policy with positive basic research investments and a tax policy favoring entrepreneur-
ship if and only if this will lead to higher labor supply in final-good production and
hence higher consumption vis-à-vis the stagnant economy. In the stagnant economy,
labor supply for final-good production is given by Ly = L̄ − m. Hence we observe
from Proposition 1 (equations (1) and (3)) that the government will opt for the en-
trepreneurial economy if and only if Ly in this case is larger than L̄ −m and thus if
23
and only if it satisfies the following Positive Labor Savings (PLS) condition:40
−L̃B(τ ) +

1−
1
τbχ
(
L̃B(τ)
)


[
χ
(
L̃B(τ)
)
− 1
]
≥ 0 . (PLS)
We summarize the optimal policy schemes as follows:
Proposition 3
Suppose the government maximizes aggregate consumption using (tL, tP , tH , LB) as
policy instruments. Then:
(i) If and only if condition (PLS) is satisfied, there will be an entrepreneurial economy
with τ ∗ = τ , L∗B = L̃B(τ ) and LE = 1−
1
τbχ(L̃B(τ))
.
(ii) Otherwise, there will be a stagnant economy with τ ∗ = τ , L∗B = 0 and LE = 0.
We next analyze condition (PLS) more closely in order to deduce when an entrepreneurial
economy is likely to be optimal.
Corollary 1
Suppose the government maximizes aggregate consumption using (tL, tP , tH , LB) as
policy instruments. Then the higher m, b, and τ , and the lower γ, the more likely it is
that an entrepreneurial economy will be optimal.
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in appendix B.2. Corollary 1 implies that the more
valuable innovations are, i.e. the higher m is and the lower γ is, the more likely it is
that we will observe an entrepreneurial economy. Further, an entrepreneurial economy
is more likely, the higher the maximum admissible level of τ , τ , is and the higher the
utility benefits (the lower the utility costs) derived from becoming an entrepreneur will
be, i.e. the higher b is. Intuitively, the higher τ and b are, the higher the number of
entrepreneurs will be who are willing to take up knowledge from basic research invest-
ments in the entrepreneurial economy and hence the more attractive entrepreneurial
policies will be.41
40This case is illustrated in Figure 1, where the condition says that the amount of labor employed
in final good production in the entrepreneurial economy is larger than in the stagnant economy.
Rewriting condition PLS as LB +LE ≤ χ(LB)LE reveals the trade-off described earlier: Labor saving
in the intermediate good sector must be larger than the number of basic researchers and entrepreneurs.
41An entrepreneur compares the wage with the utility received from being an entrepreneur. This is
the key trade-off a potential entrepreneur faces and determines the private value of entrepreneurship.
The occupational choice of a potential entrepreneur, however, has various further effects on the econ-
omy which determine the social value of entrepreneurship. In particular, this choice will impact wages,
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Note that with lump-sum taxes, separating the choice of LB from that of the ratio
between labor and profit taxes as captured in τ was feasible. In the working-paper
version of our paper (Gersbach et al., 2014), we show that the pecking order result also
holds when lump-sum taxes or transfers are not available.42
6 Political constraints on growth-oriented
entrepreneurial policies
So far we have adopted the viewpoint of a government that seeks to maximize aggre-
gate consumption and disregards distributional effects. Our analyses of the previous
sections suggest that innovation-stimulating investments in basic research should be
complemented by a taxation pecking order. However, such innovation policies may
have substantial distributional effects, in particular when there is inequality in the
shareholdings of the final-good producer. Since basic research investments support
labor-saving technological progress in the intermediate-good sector, labor is set free
in the intermediate-good sector and additionally supplied to final-good production.43
which in turn will feed back into profits earned by final good producers and by other entrepreneurs.
Further, a higher number of entrepreneurs increases the marginal product of the public good ‘basic
research’, and therefore affects the amount of basic research provided by the government. Being a pure
public good, the additional amount of public research increases the innovation success probabilities
of all entrepreneurs. With sufficiently high basic research, the net effect of entrepreneurship will be
positive, inducing the government to attract additional entrepreneurs via tax policies. This is the
complementarity reflected in the optimal joint policies outlined in Proposition 3.
42In our model, we assume that basic research is a public good that increases the probability of
innovation by the same amount in the different intermediate good sectors. The survey by Salter and
Martin (2001) shows that there is great heterogeneity in the relationship between basic research and
innovation across sectors. Including such heterogeneity in our model would not substantially affect the
main mechanisms considered here. It would imply, however, that the government wants to concentrate
basic research spending in sectors with particularly high effect on innovation probabilities. Depending
on whether or not there is asymmetric information about innovation prospects, entrepreneurs self
select into sectors with the highest innovation probability and there may or may not be a case for
differential tax treatment of entrepreneurship in different sectors, if possible. In reality, we observe
some spending priorities of governments or supra-governmental bodies like the EU when it comes to
basic research (such as e.g. priorities for basic research in the United Kingdom in House of Lords
(2010), or the EU Horizon 2020 priorities under https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/).
However, we do not normally observe different tax treatment of entrepreneurs in different sectors.
One of the reasons is that sector classifications of profits can easily be manipulated in firms operating
in multiple industries.
43Note that without declining wages due to wage rigidities, the final good firms would not employ
extra labor set free by labor saving innovation in the intermediate good sector. In this case, labor
saving innovation will lead to unemployment rather than increased output. While several countries
have rigid wages, they are typically nominally fixed so that they will decline over time in real terms
due to inflation if such inflation is present. Moreover, in many European countries we observed labor
market reforms that effectively reduced real wages and made labor markets more flexible to reduce
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This increases output and the profits of the representative final-good producer, but it
also lowers wages.44,45 Then, as we will see below, a share of individuals is worse off
under an entrepreneurial policy vis-à-vis a stagnant economy. Hence, while ownership
in the final-good firm is irrelevant for consumption-maximizing policies, it is crucial for
the distributional effects of such policies. It is therefore by no means obvious that a
change to an entrepreneurial policy will be supported politically. In this section we ex-
plore these distributional effects and indicate when policies fostering entrepreneurship
are politically viable.
In our political economy analysis, we focus on a politically decisive individual whom
we refer to as the median voter and ask whether the median voter’s preferred policy
will be an entrepreneurial policy or a stagnant policy. We assume that the median
unemployment. Hence in some countries the increase in total output may realize over the medium term
rather than in the short run. Additionally, high labor taxes may drive people into own employment
where they live on low dividends. We note, however, that for workers to resort to an outside option
possibly in the informal sector, this option must be at least as good as working in the formal sector.
Including such an outside option with fixed income would then present a way of endogenously deriving
the upper tax bound on labor taxes. Another very interesting extension would be to include a labor
supply choice by the households who can decide on the hours they work in the formal sector or in own
employment. In this case, higher labor taxes would reduce the labor supply at the margin, thereby
moderating our results while keeping our main mechanism intact.
44These implications are consistent with the common trend across industrialized economies that
labor income – in particular labor income of low-skilled workers – as a share of total value added
is decreasing over time. Timmer et al. (2010), for example, show that in the European Union the
workers’ share in total value added decreased from 72.1% in 1980 to 66.2% in 2005. In the US this
share decreased from 66.8% to 63.2%. At the same time, the share of high-skilled workers’ income in
total value added increases rapidly over time. In the EU, this share increased from 8.3% in 1980 to
16.0% in 2005, while in the US it increased from 18.5% to 30.4%. See also Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014).
45With divisible intermediate goods, labor-saving technological progress in the intermediate-good
sector would not result in a decrease in wages. Still, there would be a conflict between efficiency
and equality in our economy as discussed here, at least if innovations are non-drastic as in Acemoglu
et al. (2006): with divisible intermediates, an innovating entrepreneur would preferably charge a
price p(i) = mwγ
α
. For γ > α this is not feasible due to competition from standard technology,
and the innovative entrepreneur sets price p(i) = mw instead. In that sense innovations are non-
drastic. p(i) = mw ∀ i, implies that w = [1− α]
(1−α) [ α
m
]α
and hence the wage rate is independent
of innovation step γ in the economy. Intuitively, wages depend on the marginal product of labor
in final-good production and hence on the ratio of labor to intermediates used in production. With
constant intermediate-good prices, this is the same irrespective of the production technology in the
intermediate-good sector. The monopoly distortion in the intermediate-good sector prevents the
introduction of more intermediate-good-intense production processes in final-good production and
hence a higher marginal product of labor. Note that with constant gross wages, a conflict between
efficiency and equality follows from tax policies. In the entrepreneurial economy, workers contribute
to the provision of basic research and hence end up with lower net wages than in the stagnant
economy, where government spendings are zero. Obviously, with constant returns to scale and divisible
intermediates, the final-good producer will earn zero profits, and benefits from innovation accrue to
the successful entrepreneurs. So, in such circumstances, shareholdings in the final-good firms do not
matter for the distribution of gains from innovation.
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voter is an employee (i.e. a worker in final or intermediate-good production or a basic
researcher) with a fraction s ≥ 0 of the per-capita shares in the final-good producer’s
profits.46 Consequently, her after tax income is:
I = (1− tL)w + (1− tP )s
πy
L̄
− tH .
An entrepreneurial policy is politically viable if it is supported by the median voter. The
most common interpretation is as follows: We order voters according to their shares in
final-good production and interpret the decisive individual as the voter with the median
amount of shares whose preferred policy will be adopted as the platform of two parties
in a Downsian framework of party competition. In appendix A.1 we rationalize this
interpretation within our model set-up. Due to constitutional provisions or lobbying,
etc., the decisive individual may differ from the individual with the median amount of
shares. Our political economy analysis is flexible enough to accommodate such settings
by adjusting the shareholdings of the decisive individual, s, accordingly.
We will now characterize the preferred policy of the median voter. In doing so, we
restrict our analysis in two ways: first, we restrict attention to growth-oriented en-
trepreneurial policies, where here and below we say that an entrepreneurial policy (and
the associated entrepreneurial economy) is growth-oriented if it yields an increase in
final-good production vis-à-vis the stagnant economy. Second, we focus on lump-sum
redistribution and leave to future research considerations regarding targeted transfers to
a fraction of workers only.47 To simplify the exposition we further assume common tax
bounds for labor income and for profit taxes, that is, we assume tP = tL = t ∈ [0, 1−ε]
and tP = tL = t ∈ [0, 1 − ε] for some arbitrarily small ε > 0 and t ≥ t. Consequently,
46Of course, this includes the special case where the median voter is a worker without any shares.
This occurs when a fraction 12 < µ < 1 of the population are workers who do not own shares in
the final-good producer. The situation where a majority of the population are workers who are not
engaged in the stock market is in line with empirical evidence on stock market participation rates.
Guiso et al. (2008), for example, establish for a selection of 12 OECD member states percentages
of households that are engaged in the stock market. Even if indirect shareholdings are taken into
consideration, Sweden is the only country where a majority of households is engaged in the stock
market. In most countries, fewer than one-third of households hold shares.
47Analytically, we remain within the framework introduced in section 5.2. Note that without
lump-sum taxes, redistribution via tax policies is no longer feasible and it turns out that a growth-
oriented entrepreneurial economy is no longer supported by the median voter if shareholdings are
sufficiently skewed. In particular, the median voter will always prefer the stagnant economy over
the entrepreneurial economy if she owns less than a fraction L̄
L̄+(1−γ)m
of the per-capita shares in the
final-good producer. The reason is that in such case the gross income of the median voter is decreasing
in aggregate output, as shown in the proof of Proposition 5. Hence she can be no better off in the
growth-oriented entrepreneurial economy than in the stagnant economy with tL = tP = 0. Note that
the condition discussed here is sufficient but not necessary for our result.
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τ ∈ [τ , τ ] :=
[
1−t
1−t
, 1−t
1−t
]
and τ < ∞.
Of course, since relative to a stagnant economy a growth-oriented entrepreneurial policy
means falling wages and increasing final-good profits, the median voter will support an
entrepreneurial economy if she possesses a sufficient amount of shares in the final-good
firms. The more realistic and interesting case is when income is skewed in such a way
that the median voter possesses less than the per-capita claims on final-good profits.
In particular, we assume that s ∈
[
0, L̄
L̄+(1−γ)m
)
, which implies that the median voter’s
gross income, w + sπy
L̄
, decreases in aggregate output (see proof of Proposition 5 in
appendix B.4).48 The resulting trade-off follows immediately. On the one hand, wages
are higher in the stagnant economy, and the median voter can maximally redistribute
profits using the highest possible tax rate without considering incentives for occupa-
tional choice by potential entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the tax base is higher in
a growth-oriented entrepreneurial economy, potentially allowing for higher redistribu-
tional transfers even if profit tax rates are lower. For this reason, an entrepreneurial
economy may be preferred to a stagnant economy with maximal profit tax.
The trade-off faced by the median voter as described above can be captured in a
convenient way by separating the two parts of the median voter’s income, gross earnings
and net transfers:
I = (1− tL)w + (1− tP )s
πy
L̄
− tH = w + s
πy
L̄
+NT , (13)
where w + sπy
L̄
reflects the median voter’s gross income and NT = −tH − tLw − tP s
πy
L̄
denotes net transfers to her. We obtain lump-sum tax, tH , from the government’s
budget constraint as:
tH =
1
L̄
[
−tLw
(
L̄− LE
)
− tP (πy + η(LB)LEπxm) + wLB
]
. (14)
One important observation is that for given basic research investments, the level of
entrepreneurship and production is determined only by the ratio of tax rates, τ = 1−tP
1−tL
,
but not by the absolute values of tax rates. Hence the median voter’s gross income
is uniquely determined by the choices of τ and LB. The levels of the labor- and
profit-tax rates only matter for the degree of redistribution, as becomes apparent when
we insert the lump-sum transfers (14) into the formula for the net transfers NT .49
48Note that when the population is ordered according to shareholdings in the final-good sector, we
must have s ∈ [0, 2).
49Substituting the profits by their equilibrium values as provided in Proposition 1, we obtain for
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As a consequence, we can determine the median voter’s most preferred policy by the
following procedure: first, we derive the optimal amount of redistribution by choosing
the levels of tL and tP for given τ and LB. This will allow us to write the median
voter’s objective as a function of τ and LB and consequently to determine the median
voter’s most preferred levels of τ and basic research investments LB.
We discuss the median voter’s maximization problem in detail in appendix A.2. In
the first step in the optimization problem (for given τ and LB), the median voter
aims at setting tL and tP to maximize net transfers NT . In particular, we observe
in the typical case that the median voter will either push tL or tP to its boundary
t. As a consequence, for any policy (τ, LB), the level of redistribution that can be
realized is constrained by the economy’s upper bound on tax rates, which, as discussed
in the introduction, may be constitutional in nature or reflect the state’s capacity to
collect taxes. Now any growth-oriented entrepreneurial economy involves a loss in gross
income for the median voter that needs to be compensated for by transfers if it is to
be politically viable. Whether the transfers are sufficiently large depends crucially on
the upper bounds on taxation. As stated in the following proposition, any growth-
oriented entrepreneurial policy can be supported by sufficient redistribution when t is
close enough to one:
Proposition 4
If there exists an entrepreneurial economy (τ̂ , L̂B) with higher aggregate output than
a stagnant economy, then there also exists a constitutional upper limit of tax rates t
such that τ̂ ∈ [τ , τ ] and the median voter will prefer the entrepreneurial economy over
a stagnant economy.
The proof is given in appendix B.3. The intuition is straightforward: with t sufficiently
close to 1, it is feasible to implement any τ with tP close to 1. Hence, all profits can
effectively be redistributed in the entrepreneurial economy via the lump-sum transfer,
allowing all workers to benefit from the increase in aggregate output.
The main insight of Proposition 4 is that incentives for entrepreneurship by a high
value of τ as well as redistribution of profits by a sufficiently high value of tP can
be reconciled if the upper boundary on tax rates is very close to 1. However, if the
the net transfers to the median voter:
NT =
w
L̄
[
tP
[(
α
1− α
Ly −m
)
(1 − s) + χ(LB)LE
]
− tLLE − LB
]
. (15)
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upper and lower bounds on taxation are too low, it will not be possible to provide
both incentives for economic feasibility and redistribution for the political viability of
an entrepreneurial economy.
Proposition 5
Let t = 0. If t is sufficiently low, the median voter will support a stagnant economy.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in appendix B.4. Intuitively, for sufficiently re-
strictive tax bounds, redistribution of profits via the lump-sum taxes can no longer
compensate for the decrease in labor income associated with the entrepreneurial econ-
omy, so the median voter will prefer the stagnant economy.
Using the results in Propositions 4 and 5, we argue in the next proposition that for
every growth-oriented entrepreneurial policy there exists a unique level of tc making
the policy politically viable in an economy with t ≥ tc but not if t < tc.
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Proposition 6
Let t = 0. For any growth-oriented entrepreneurial policy (τ̂ , L̂B), there exists a
critical value 0 < tc < 1 such that τ̂ ∈ [τ , τ ], and the median voter will prefer the
entrepreneurial policy over the stagnant economy if and only if t ≥ tc.
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in appendix B.5. The key observation is now
that each growth-oriented entrepreneurial policy is associated with a unique tc. Hence,
considering the entire set of growth-oriented entrepreneurial policies, we can determine
the infimum tinf = inf
{
tc
}
. This infimum of critical upper tax bounds is particularly
interesting as it tells us that an economy will only be able to escape a stagnant policy
regime if its constitutional upper bound on taxes or its fiscal capacity is sufficiently
large to satisfy t ≥ tinf . We summarize this insight in the next corollary, which follows
immediately from Proposition 6:51
50More formally, let t = 0 and fix any entrepreneurial policy (τ̂ , L̂B) with L̂y > L
S
y . Proposition 4
implies that this entrepreneurial economy will be preferred to the stagnant economy by the median
voter if t is sufficiently high. Proposition 5 implies that this is no longer the case if t is sufficiently
low. In principle, there are two possibilities why this might happen: first, t might prevent sufficiently
large transfers to the median voter; second, for t too low, τ̂ might no longer be available, i.e. we might
have τ̂ /∈ [τ , τ ]. Let us say that the entrepreneurial economy (τ̂ , L̂B) is feasible in the median voter
framework if τ̂ ∈ [τ , τ ] and if it is preferred to the stagnant economy by the median voter. Then, for
every such entrepreneurial economy there must exist a threshold value t
l
c such that the entrepreneurial
economy is no longer feasible if t < t
l
c and a threshold value t
u
c such that the entrepreneurial economy
is feasible if t ≥ t
u
c . We summarize these insights in Proposition 6 and show in appendix B.5 that
these two threshold values coincide.
51Recall that we are disregarding policies with output-decreasing entrepreneurship and/or basic
research.
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Corollary 2
The median voter will opt for a growth-oriented entrepreneurial policy if and only if
t ≥ tinf . Otherwise, the median voter will support the stagnant economy.
Note that tinf > 0 follows directly from Proposition 5. Corollary 2 implies that en-
trepreneurial policies are precluded if upper tax bounds are too low and the society is
‘trapped’ in a stagnant economy. Upper bounds on taxation specified in the constitu-
tion are frequently intended to protect against expropriation, in particular to protect
the wealthy members of society. Our analysis suggests that such policy instruments
need not always be efficient. While for a given policy τ, LB, workers with large share-
holdings (i.e. s̃ > 1 +
LE[χ(LB)− 1τ ]
α
1−α
Ly−m
) will prefer to have a low upper tax bound,52 this
is not necessarily the case if the policy τ, LB is determined in the political process. In
such cases, wealthy households with at least as many shares as the median voter may
prefer to have a higher t. The following corollary is a manifestation of this logic:
Corollary 3
Consider two upper tax bounds th and tl satisfying th > tinf > tl. Then we can always
find parameter values such that the wealthy households with shareholdings s̃ > s will
prefer living in an economy with th to living in an economy with tl.
Corollary 3 follows immediately from consideration of the limiting case of L̄ = m
α
. Here
the final-good producer has zero profits in the stagnant economy and shareholdings
are worthless, irrespective of tax policies. Corollary 2 implies that the median voter
with s shares will prefer any t ≥ tinf to any alternative t < tinf . As all individuals
with shareholdings larger than s will benefit even more from the profits accruing in a
growth-oriented entrepreneurial economy, they will also prefer th > tinf to tl < tinf .
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Such unintended harmful effects are not limited to constitutional tax bounds but may
also apply to alternative means of protecting against excessive taxes. In particular,
supermajority rules might have similar effects in our model.54 Some entrepreneurial
52The result follows from the fact that for τ and LB given, their net transfers decrease in tP by
equation (A.2).
53A formal argument why all individuals with larger shareholdings than the median voter will prefer
an entrepreneurial economy if the median voter does so is provided in appendix A.1.
54Several US states have supermajority rules for tax increases (cf. National Conference of State
Legislatures (2010); Gradstein (1999) provides a historical overview). In the past, similar clauses
have also been proposed at the federal level, but they have not been accepted (cf. Knight, 2000).
These supermajority rules have also been addressed in the literature. Gradstein (1999) rationalizes
them as a precommitment device for a benevolent government in a model with time-leading private
productive investments. In his model, there is a time-inconsistency in the government’s preferences, as
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economies supported by the median voter may not be supported by voters with fewer
shares and hence may not pass supermajority requirements.55 It follows that for t given,
a society with supermajority requirements may be ‘trapped’ in a stagnant economy,
whereas an entrepreneurial economy would be politically feasible in the median voter
framework.
6.1 Data overview and numerical example
In this section, we add empirical observations to our theoretical predictions. Unfor-
tunately, the lack of data hinders a thorough empirical comparison of stagnant and
entrepreneurial economies. We therefore pursue a dual approach. We begin by briefly
describing the empirical counterparts of our key policy variables: basic research invest-
ments, corporate and labor income taxes. Table 6.1 depicts the values for all three
variables in 2013 for a subset of OECD countries.56 We provide information on all
OECD countries in appendix C. Based on this data and data on fiscal capacity, we
present a preliminary view on the relationship between tax bounds and basic research
and tax stimuli for entrepreneurship, respectively. Second, we present a calibrated ver-
sion of our theoretical model to illustrate entrepreneurial policies in an ‘ideal’ economy
that exhibits key average characteristics of OECD member states.
Table 1: Data Overviewa
Basic research
exp. as perc. of
GDPb
Corporate in-
come tax ratesc
Income tax rates
at average wagesc
Australia 0.45d 30.0 23.1
Austria 0.56 25.0 34.4
Belgium 0.49 33.0 33.7
Chile 0.11 20.0 7.0
Czech Republic 0.62 19.0 14.6
Denmark 0.54 25.0 32.2
Estonia 0.37 21.0 16.4
France 0.54 38.0 22.7
the government would like to levy high taxes once private investments have been made. Supermajority
rules can help resolve this time-inconsistency. Knight (2000) presents US-based evidence suggesting
that supermajority requirements do indeed have a dampening effect on taxes.
55Formally, in appendix A.1, we show that in our model the single-crossing condition holds for
workers’ preferences over policies. In particular, in Lemma 2 we show that if a worker with shares ŝ
prefers a growth-oriented entrepreneurial policy to the stagnant economy, then so do all workers with
shares s ≥ ŝ.
56We have chosen the year 2013 as it gives a recent account and has one of the highest levels of
data availability.
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Table 1: Data Overviewa
Basic research
exp. as perc. of
GDPb
Corporate in-
come tax ratesc
Income tax rates
at average wagesc
Greece 0.28 26.0 26.9
Ireland 0.30 12.5 14.3
Israel 0.40 25.0 16.4
Italy 0.33 27.5 28.8
Japan 0.44 28.1 20.0
Korea 0.75 22.0 12.9
Norway 0.29 28.0 26.7
Poland 0.23 19.0 20.8
Spain 0.27 30.0 19.0
Switzerland 0.90e 8.5 14.0
United Kingdom 0.20 21.0 24.0
United States 0.48 35.0 20.6
a All data is from the year 2013 if not noted otherwise.
b Source: OECD (2016a).
c Source: OECD (2016b).
d Data from 2008.
e Data from 2012.
Basic research amounts to non-trivial and growing-over-time shares of GDP: Most
OECD countries devote a share of their GDP of around 0.4% to basic research. As
table 6.1 illustrates, these investments vary across countries. While countries further
away from the world technological frontier tend to spend less, e.g. Chile spends only
slightly more than 0.1% of its GDP on basic research, Switzerland is an outlier at the
top with almost 1% of GDP spent on basic research (OECD, 2016a).57
Corporate income tax rates tend to be decreasing over time in most OECD countries,
pointing to fiercer international tax competition which may be an important source of
effective bounds on taxation in reality. The tax rates vary from lows of around 10% in
Ireland and Switzerland to highs of around 35% in some countries including the U.S.,
with the vast majority of OECD countries having corporate income tax rates between
20% and 25% (OECD, 2016b).58,59 The personal income tax at average wages is within
57Cf. Gersbach et al. (2015) for further details.
58Note that profits of start-up entrepreneurs might first fall under the personal income tax scheme
before the entrepreneurs incorporate. Moreover, depending on the tax bases as well as tax breaks and
exemptions, the effective tax rates that companies have to pay on their profits can differ significantly
from the statutory rates. We refer to Djankov et al. (2010) for a measure of effective corporate income
tax rates in 2004 for 85 countries including almost all OECD countries.
59In the case of Switzerland, cantons and local authorities levy additional taxes on corporate income.
The corporate income tax rate therefore depends on the location of a firm. The effective tax rate
can be as low as 12% in certain locations (https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/
Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-corporate-tax-rates.pdf).
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a range similar to the corporate income tax, with a low of less than 10% in Chile, and
with most OECD countries between 15% and 25%. There seems to have been no trend
over the last 15 years (OECD, 2016b). These tax rates apply to a person without
children, and effective tax rates can vary with family status among other things. In
trying to distil the essence of the large complexities of different countries’ tax systems,
Djankov et al. (2010) create a measure of effective corporate income tax rates in 2004
for 85 countries including almost all OECD countries. We use this data along with their
data on labor taxes to construct our measure for the tax incentives for entrepreneurship
τ . Among OECD member states, this measure varies from a low of around 0.74 in New
Zealand to a high of around 1.38 in France.
Our theoretical analysis demonstrates that bounds on taxation may be important im-
pediments to implementing growth policies in the political process. While, except for
the case of Switzerland, countries do typically not have explicit constitutional bounds
on taxation, such bounds in OECD countries implicitly arise from international agree-
ments and from the following constitutional principles:
− the principle of equality, i.e. taxes must be applied impartially and equally
− the principle of ability to pay, i.e. taxpayers must be reasonably able to fulfill
their fiscal obligations
− the principle of public purpose, i.e. a tax must have a public purpose and cannot
be used for private ends.
For an in-depth analysis and comparative assessments see Vanistendael (1996); McLure
and van Houtte (2011); De Caria (2017).
An alternative view on the tax constraints is that they arise from fiscal capacity. To
give a first overview of the potential role of such constraints in shaping entrepreneurial
policies, we combine the above data with a measure of the countries’ capacity to collect
taxes taken from Besley and Persson (2009): the countries’ share of income taxes in
GDP. We start with the relationship between basic research and fiscal capacity. It is
well known that basic research is most and for all performed in industrialized countries,
with developing countries spending very little.60 While there are certainly other factors
at play, considering that developing countries are precisely the ones with low fiscal
capacity (cf. Figure 4 in section 7), this relationship is consistent with our theoretical
predictions. Zooming in on OECD countries, the first graph in Figure 2 shows a positive
60Cf. UNESCO (2015).
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Figure 2: Fiscal capacity, basic research expenditures and tax incentives for en-
trepreneurship in OECD countries
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Source: The underlying data is as described in the main body of the text. The data on the share
of income taxes refers to averages from 1975 onwards. Data on basic research per GDP refers to
5-year-centered moving averages in 2005. Note that not all data were available for every OECD
country.
relationship between fiscal capacity and basic research expenditures per GDP in OECD
countries.61 We turn to tax incentives for entrepreneurship next. The second graph
in Figure 2 plots for OECD countries our measure of τ against the share of income
taxes in GDP. Although being far from conclusive, this illustration reflects the positive
relation between fiscal capacity and tax incentives for entrepreneurship that we find
in our theory.62 The data described are supposed to give a first overview of the real
equivalents of the model’s key variables, while a thorough empirical analysis of whether
we can find stagnant and entrepreneurial economies in the data is beyond the scope of
the paper and left for future research.
To illustrate the arguments behind the political feasibility of entrepreneurial policies, we
consider a calibrated version of our economic model next. We specify the parameters
in the model such that an entrepreneurial economy matches OECD data on basic
research expenditures and entrepreneurship, and assume that output is 5.7% higher
in the entrepreneurial than in a baseline stagnant economy. This corresponds to the
average rate of total factor productivity growth in OECD countries between 1996 and
2006. With regard to policy variables, we choose a basic research intensity of 0.33%
and τ = 1.01, which correspond to the respective averages across OECD countries.
Further details on our parameter value choices are provided in appendix A.3.
61The upward trend would be stronger if we included the remaining four (non-OECD) countries
with data on both variables: Argentina, China, Singapore, and South Africa.
62Interestingly, we do not find a similar relationship among non-OECD countries, arguably the ones
for which basic research stimulated innovative entrepreneurship is less important.
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We use the calibration of our model to illustrate the effects of a change in the upper
bound on taxation. For that purpose, we consider a median voter with s = 0.5 shares.63
Moving from the top-left panel to the bottom-right panel in Figure 3, the upper bound
on tax rates, t, increases from 0.3 to 0.99. In each of the panels in Figure 3, the black
lines represent the smallest and largest level of τ that is feasible with the respective
upper tax bound. Only policies inside the area enclosed by these two lines – shaded
in gray in Figure 3 – are feasible in the sense that τ ∈ [τ , τ ]. The green line in the
policy space (τ, LB) indicates policy choices for which the condition (PLS) is equal
to zero, thereby separating the growth-oriented entrepreneurial policies to the upper
right of the line from the output-decreasing entrepreneurial policies on the lower left.
A growth-oriented entrepreneurial policy in our context means that output is higher
and the wage rates lower than in a stagnant economy. Accordingly, the median voter
with a sufficiently small amount of shares in final-good production will not support a
growth-oriented entrepreneurial policy without compensation from net transfers.
For each policy (τ, LB), we can derive the median voter’s optimal amount of net trans-
fers given the upper bounds on tax rates, t. We can then compare these net transfers
to the net transfers in the stagnant economy. The blue lines in Figure 3 indicate en-
trepreneurial policies for which the net transfers are just as large as in the stagnant
economy. Only in the area enclosed by these blue lines is the net transfer higher in
the entrepreneurial economy, and we can thus hope for political support for a growth-
oriented entrepreneurial policy. Adding up the differences in gross income and in net
transfers between the entrepreneurial economy and the stagnant economy yields the
difference in net income. All entrepreneurial policies for which this difference is positive
are preferred by the median voter to the stagnant economy. In Figure 3, this is the case
for all policies inside the areas enclosed by the red lines. All policies in the intersection
of these areas with the areas shaded in gray are feasible in the sense that the median
voter will prefer them to the stagnant economy and that τ ∈ [τ , τ ]. We note that
the set of growth-oriented entrepreneurial policies supported by the median voter is a
subset of the growth-oriented entrepreneurial policies where the net transfer difference
is positive. This is because in the move from the stagnant policy to a growth-oriented
entrepreneurial policy the median voter’s gross income will decline.
63In the appendix of the working-paper version of our paper (Gersbach et al., 2014) we show results
for s = 0 and for s = 1, respectively.
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Figure 3: Illustration of politically feasible entrepreneurial policies for L̄ = 20: s = 0.5
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
L
B
τ
t =0.3
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
L
B
τ
t =0.45
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
L
B
τ
t =0.75
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
L
B
τ
t =0.99
Moving from the top-left panel to the bottom-right panel, the upper tax bound becomes
larger, thereby increasing possibilities for redistribution. As our theory predicts, this
increases the set of entrepreneurial policies with higher net transfers than in the stag-
nant economy, that is, it increases the area enclosed by the blue lines in the different
panels. Of course, the higher redistributive possibilities imply that the balance between
efficiency and redistribution can be achieved for a greater set of entrepreneurial poli-
cies. Consequently, the area enclosed by the red lines increases as well. In accordance
with Proposition 4, we observe in the bottom-right panel that when t approaches 1,
the entire area comprising growth-oriented entrepreneurial policies will be politically
viable. In the top-left panel we observe the opposite case, where the tax bound is too
37
restrictive and the median voter will prefer the stagnant economy, as indicated by the
red cross, which marks her most preferred policy. As t increases, this most preferred
policy becomes more growth-oriented, i.e. the median voter will prefer a higher τ and a
higher LB. Yet this policy is clearly inefficient vis-à-vis the output-maximizing policy,
as indicated by the green cross.
7 Extensions and further implications
The results presented above have a series of further interesting implications. In this
section, we briefly discuss these implications in turn. We begin with a brief discussion
of the robustness of our main insights with regard to alternative specifications.
Extensions
In our model, households own shares on final good firms, while the incumbent inter-
mediate good firms make zero profits. The latter is due to our assumption that any
technology can be used freely by competitors after one period (see footnote 12). An
interesting extension is to consider the case where the monopoly position could be re-
tained for longer and part of the voters also held shares of intermediate good producers.
When it comes to entrepreneurial policies, these voters then face the additional cost of
losing rents to innovative entrants into intermediate good production. Still our logic
regarding the political feasibility of entrepreneurial policies would remain intact and,
in fact, may be reinforced. Suppose the median voter owns shares in an incumbent
intermediate good firm. Then redistribution of increased profits obtained in final good
production and by entrants would not only need to compensate the median voter for
a falling wage, but also for her expected loss of monopoly rents.
On top of that, the stagnant economy may be more appealing for the median voter.
This would all the more be the case if it was possible to tax entrants’ profits at a
higher rate than incumbents’ in the intermediate good sector. Then a median voter
with substantial shares in incumbent intermediate firms may support such a policy to
keep entrants out, thereby leading to a stagnant economy. However, if the upper bounds
on taxation are sufficiently high, there will typically still exist ways of redistributing
the additional gains in final good firms’ and entrants’ profits so as to make the median
voter support an entrepreneurial economy nonetheless.
More generally, the availability of more sophisticated tax instruments will impact the
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political feasibility of entrepreneurial policies. In particular, if distributional reasons
prevent the existence of an entrepreneurial economy, it may be optimal to tax profits
in the final-good sector differently from those in the innovative intermediate-good sec-
tor. This would allow redistribution of profits from final-good firms without affecting
occupational choices. Typically, however, such tax discrimination is either not possible
or is limited in its scope. For instance, intermediate-good firms and final-good firms
would find it profitable to integrate and to shift profits through transfer pricing to
intermediate-good production. Moreover, asymmetric information regarding innova-
tion capabilities makes it impossible for the government to distinguish between firms
with promising innovation prospects and those with no such prospects. Similar prob-
lems would exist if the government wanted to distinguish lump-sum transfers between
workers and entrepreneurs. If this was possible, however, the government would have
an additional instrument of increasing the attractiveness of entrepreneurship without
affecting the tax on final good firms’ profits which are the main aim for redistribu-
tion. This would make it easier for the government to gather political support for
entrepreneurial policies. In general, political support for growth policies would be
achieved most effectively if the government could target transfers to all voters losing
out from entrepreneurial policies while possessing at least as many shares as the median
voter.
However, in reality it is typically hard to assess the amount of wealth different indi-
viduals in society possess and target subsidies accordingly. For these reasons we argue
it is sensible to focus on the tax instruments we emphasize. However, we acknowledge
that the corporate tax system is very complex and may affect entrepreneurs differently
from incumbent firms. Incorporating these details is beyond the scope of our paper
and would certainly be interesting for future research.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that our political economy results are valid beyond
the specific set-up considered here. Whenever it is socially desirable to incentivize
entrepreneurship via tax policies and innovation brings about distributional conflicts,
an efficiency equality trade-off along the lines considered here arises that may result in
the political conflict over growth policies we discuss.
Inefficiencies caused by the political process
The political process implies that tax policies can be inefficient – in the sense that
aggregate output is not maximal – if the income distribution (in our case the distri-
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bution of shareholdings) is skewed to the right as in the classical findings by Romer
(1975), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981).64 We take the insights from
this literature further as in our model such inefficiencies can arise both at the extensive
and at the intensive margin. If bounds on taxation are too restrictive, then the median
voter will prefer a stagnant economy to any growth-oriented entrepreneurial policy and
her policy choice is inefficient at the extensive margin. If her preferred policy choice
is an entrepreneurial policy, then inefficiency will arise vis-à-vis the optimal growth
policies at the intensive margin. This inefficiency follows directly from the fact that
tP = 0 maximizes aggregate consumption in an entrepreneurial economy and this can
never be optimal from the point of view of the median voter. Both inefficiencies are
the more severe, the fewer shares the median voter possesses, i.e. the more skewed
the income distribution is. However, if t = 1 − ε and ε → 0, then the inefficiencies
generally become arbitrarily small, irrespective of the median voter’s shareholdings.65
The inefficiency also concerns basic research investments. Consider any choice of labor
income and profit taxes, t̂L, t̂P with L̂B = L̃B(τ̂ ) > 0, i.e. given this tax policy it is
socially desirable to invest in basic research.66 Then ∂Ly
∂LB
∣
∣
∣
t̂L,t̂P ,L̂B
= 0 but ∂I
∂LB
∣
∣
∣
t̂L,t̂P ,L̂B
6=
0 in general. In fact, the median voter will typically invest too little in basic research.
Intuitively, via a reduction in the lump-sum transfer, the median voter pays the per-
capita share of any increase in basic research investments. However, she benefits less
than average from the associated increase in aggregate output due to the decrease
in gross income.67 Interestingly, with the median voter investing less than the social
optimum in basic research, the political equilibrium can help explain the surprisingly
high rates of return to public (basic) research typically found in empirical studies.68
64Cf. Persson and Tabellini (2002) for a discussion and Traxler (2012) for a more recent example
from the related literature.
65This is not necessarily the case if the median voter can earn more than the per-capita income in
the output-maximizing entrepreneurial economy. Cf. footnote 88.
66Recall that we limit our attention to growth-oriented entrepreneurial economies. For t̂L, t̂P with
L̂B = L̃B(τ̂ ) = 0 no such economy exists.
67For τ̂ ≥ 1, this can be shown analytically. In particular, suppose by contradiction that the median
voter invests L′B > L̃B(τ̂ ) in basic research. Note that for LB = 0 we have Ly(0, τ̂ ) ≤ L
S
y and that by
assumption we have Ly(L
′
B, τ̂ ) > L
S
y . Then, by continuity of y in LB and by the optimality of L̃B(τ̂ ),
there exists L̊B < L
′
B such that Ly(L̊B, τ̂) = Ly(L
′
B, τ̂ ). Now the median voter’s gross income is the
same for both choices of LB. However, χ(L
′
B) > 1 and τ̂ ≥ 1 imply that net transfers are larger for
L̊B than for L
′
B, a contradiction to L
′
B being optimal for the median voter.
68Cf. Salter and Martin (2001) and Toole (2012), for example.
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Constitutional design
With bounds on taxation at center stage in our model, these results also have important
implications for the design of tax rules in the constitution. Typically, decisions on tax
bounds in the constitution are thought to be taken behind a veil of ignorance as in
Brennan and Buchanan (1977). We perform the simplest exercise in our framework
and suppose that the only uncertainty individuals face behind the veil of ignorance is
the amount of shares of firms they will possess. As opposed to Brennan and Buchanan
(1977), constitutional limits on taxation are not designed as an obstacle to a Leviathan-
like government that maximizes revenue within these limits, but rather to curtail the
policy space for the median voter, who, after the resolution of the uncertainty, will
exhaust her possibilities for maximizing her income. It turns out that bounds on
taxation are rejected under a veil of ignorance. This will resolve the conflict between
efficiency and equality that is present for tighter constitutional tax bounds and will
thus induce the median voter to opt for a more growth-oriented policy. In turn, this
will increase the expected income of an individual before lifting the veil of ignorance.69
Fiscal capacity
An alternative view on the upper bounds on taxation is to interpret them as a reduced
form for fiscal capacity, as in Besley and Persson (2009) and Acemoglu (2005).70 While,
in the latter paper, fiscal capacity affects growth indirectly via its complementarity with
other state capacities, in the former article, fiscal capacity directly influences growth
as a determinant of the extent of distortionary taxation and productive investments
by self-interested governments.
Figure 4 plots fiscal capacity against GDP per capita for a cross-section of countries,
where, following Besley and Persson (2009), we have used income taxes over GDP as
a proxy for fiscal capacity. This plot indicates a strong positive relationship between
fiscal capacity and GDP per capita. Our model provides a new and intuitive political
economy rationale for why strong fiscal capacity may have a positive effect on economic
growth. In the absence of strong fiscal capacities, it may not be viable to sufficiently
redistribute the gains from innovation for a majority of the population to support such
69The detailed argument can be found in appendix A.4.
70In some developed countries with very high fiscal capacity, the upper bound on taxation may be
determined by the peak of the Laffer-curve (see e.g. Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)). However, the peak
of the Laffer-curve also depends on how tax revenues are spent (Daniel and Gao (2015)). Productive
public expenditure as in our model would make the peak of the Laffer-curve and hence the upper
bound of taxation endogenous. We leave such considerations for future research.
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Figure 4: Fiscal capacity and GDP per capita
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Source: The data on the share of income taxes in GDP is taken from Besley and Persson (2009) and
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of more than 50% have been excluded from the sample. The data was downloaded in July 2013.
policy changes.
Inclusive Growth
Our analysis in section 6 readily offers results on the feasibility of growth policies
that satisfy normative prescriptions such as the desideratum that most or all social
layers benefit from economic growth. This view is related to claims subsumed under
the term ’inclusive growth’.71 In our analysis, the characterization of implementable
policies is tied to the approval of a politically decisive individual whom we choose to
be the median voter. However, we could easily take this individual to represent the
workers with the smallest shareholdings, for example. Then, implementable policies
have to benefit at least weakly the poorest individuals in society.72 Our results on the
tax bounds then predict that with higher upper bounds on tax rates, more ambitious
growth policies can be pursued which still ensure that the poorer parts of society will
not lose out.
71Further information on different manifestations of ’inclusive growth’ can be found e.g. on the
website of the OECD.
72Such normative requirements can be implemented via alternative social choice procedures such as
super-majority rule or minority protection (cf. also the discussion in section 6).
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8 Conclusions
We have outlined a rationale for a taxation pecking order to finance basic research in-
vestments, thus presenting a new perspective on the theory of optimal income taxation.
We have subsequently assumed a political economy perspective and characterized the
conditions under which the optimal policy scheme is politically viable. In particular,
our political economy analysis suggests that entrepreneurial policies may harm workers
with little in the way of shareholdings. We have shown that upper bounds on taxation
– explicitly specified in the constitution or implicitly arising from fiscal capacity – can
undermine the political support for growth-stimulating policies. Hence our analysis
provides a political economy rationale for why weak fiscal capacities are associated
with low future income levels, the point being that the political process tends to result
in inefficient policies vis-à-vis the social optimum. This inefficiency encompasses the
amount of basic research investments, which tend to be too low. Our work may there-
fore also explain the surprisingly high rates of return to public investments in (basic)
research frequently found in empirical studies.
The above findings have further implications for the design of tax constitutions. While
upper bounds on taxation in constitutions are sometimes proposed as a means for
protecting investors from excessive indirect expropriation, the mechanisms considered
here suggest that such measures may only be efficient if growth policies are given. If, by
contrast, growth policies are subject to the political process, they may actually harm
the firm-owners they are meant to protect.
Future work may set out to integrate our analysis of the optimal financing of ba-
sic research investments into the theory on optimal taxation in the tradition of Mir-
rlees (1971). With concave utilities and the traditional supply-side effects of labor
income taxation, optimal policies would account for losses in aggregate utility from
income inequality and for potentially adverse effects on labor supply. These additional
efficiency-equality trade-offs might push optimal tax policies towards a more egalitar-
ian economy. In the presence of incomplete markets, concave utilities might also allow
additional beneficial effects of basic research on entrepreneurship and thus innovation
in the economy, as basic research can reduce idiosyncratic risks. Another interesting
avenue for future research is to extend the model to an open economy set-up where
entrepreneurs are mobile between countries and may choose location depending on the
tax codes (see Akcigit et al. (2015)). This adds an interesting perspective on tax com-
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petition between countries and would yield endogenous bounds on taxation.73 While
some of these extensions may mitigate the effects considered here, we believe that the
underlying mechanisms are still at play and that they need to be taken into consid-
eration when analyzing growth policies, both from a normative and from a positive
perspective.
73The key forces will be the tax differentials between countries on the one hand and the en-
trepreneurs’ propensity to leave on the other hand. The latter could be connected to preferences
or to differences in the quality of the public infrastructure or bureaucracy, for example. A low propen-
sity to leave will grant freedom to governments to increase the profit tax for redistributional purposes.
However, ceteris paribus, the higher the level of the domestic profit tax, the more entrepreneurs will
want to move to countries with lower profit taxes. Including such trade-offs would keep our logic
intact, but would moderate the results quantitatively.
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Appendix
A Details on political economy analysis
A.1 Applicability of median voter theorem
In this part of the appendix, we give sufficient conditions under which the median voter
theorem holds in our model. We start by elaborating on whether the preferences of the
individuals satisfy the single-crossing condition over the policy space.
Consider policy space P with policies p = (tL, tP , tH , LB) that either reflect a stagnant
economy with LB = 0 or growth-oriented entrepreneurial policies with LB > 0. We
order the policies according to their implied net final-good profit, (1−tP )πy, i.e. p2 > p1
⇔ (1−t2P )π
2
y > (1−t
1
P )π
1
y . We further order the voters according to their shareholdings.
The single-crossing condition requires that if p > p′ and s < s′, or if p < p′ and s > s′,
then from EUs(p) > EUs(p
′) it follows that EUs′(p) > EUs′(p
′). In this condition,
EUs(p) refers to the expected utility of an individual with shareholdings s under policy
p ∈ P, which can be written as:
EUs(p) =(1− tL)w − tH + s(1− tP )
πy
L̄
+ 1k∈[0,1]max {(1− tP )πxmη(LB)(1− k)b− (1− tL)w, 0} . (A.1)
We immediately observe that the single-crossing condition holds for the preferences of
all individuals with k ≥ 1, i.e. when we exclude all potential entrepreneurs. Consider
two policies p1 and p2 with p2 > p1. If a worker with shareholdings s1 prefers policy
p2, so will a worker with shareholdings s2 > s1. Further, if the person with shares s2
prefers p1 to p2, so will the individual with shares s1. Intuitively, the labor income
and the lump-sum transfers are always the same for both workers, but the worker with
the higher amount of shares benefits more from a policy involving higher net profits in
final-good production. We summarize this finding in the following lemma:
Lemma 1
The preferences of the individuals with k /∈ [0, 1) satisfy the single-crossing condition
over the policy space P.
When we consider the entire set of agents (i.e. including the set of potential en-
trepreneurs), the single-crossing condition does not hold. This can be illustrated by
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restricting the vote to one between a stagnant and an entrepreneurial policy, for in-
stance by assuming that the stagnant economy is the status quo challenged by an
entrepreneurial policy proposal. Recall that for the single crossing condition to hold
in this case, the following must be true: If the individual with the median amount of
share prefers (disfavors) the entrepreneurial policy, so will all individuals with weakly
higher (lower) shareholdings. It follows directly from equation (A.1) and Lemma 1 that
the first statement, which we recall in the next lemma, is satisfied but the statement
in parentheses is not.
Lemma 2
Suppose a worker with shareholdings ŝ prefers a growth-oriented entrepreneurial econ-
omy to the stagnant economy. Then so will all voters with shareholdings s ≥ ŝ.
Intuitively, the higher a worker’s shareholdings, the more he can benefit from the in-
crease in final-good producers’ profits associated with a growth-oriented entrepreneurial
economy. (This is implied by Lemma 1.) The result extends to potential entrepreneurs
with shareholdings s ≥ ŝ, as they will all be workers in the stagnant economy. Then
if they remain workers in the entrepreneurial economy, their trade-off is just the same
as the one faced by a worker with the same shareholdings. If, by contrast, they opt
to become entrepreneurs, they must prefer this option to being workers and the result
follows accordingly. Note that for agents with 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 the decision whether to
become an entrepreneur is captured by the maximum term in equation (A.1).
The reverse of Lemma 2 is not true. In particular, if a worker with shareholdings s
prefers the stagnant economy, a potential entrepreneur with shareholdings equal to or
less than s will not necessarily support a stagnant economy. This follows immediately
from the fact, incorporated in equation (A.1), that the utility gain from being an
entrepreneur must be weakly positive.
Hence, the single-crossing condition regarding a stagnant policy and an entrepreneurial
policy does not hold for the entire set of individuals. Moreover, note that the single-
crossing condition does not necessarily hold when we consider the voting on two dif-
ferent entrepreneurial policies. The reason is the expected gain from being an en-
trepreneur, as described in (A.1). To illustrate the argument, consider two policies
p1 > p2. Suppose that a worker with ŝ shares prefers policy p2 to policy p1. Now
consider an entrepreneur with ŝ shares as well. Note that her absolute expected gain
from being an entrepreneur as described in (A.1) may be larger for policy p1 than for
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policy p2. So, she may prefer policy p1.
The type of preferences of potential entrepreneurs can imply that the amount of shares
of the median voter may be different across different binary collective decisions. This
inhibits the direct application of the median voter theorem. However, when we order
individuals from 1 to L̄ according to the amount of shares they own, starting with the
lowest amount at k = 1, and if L̄ > 2, we will observe that the median voter on any
collective decision between p1 and p2 is in
[
L̄
2
, L̄
2
+ 1
]
. The preferences of potential
entrepreneurs can affect the location of the median voter on some binary decisions
in the interval
[
L̄
2
, L̄
2
+ 1
]
.74 All our results apply, as long as the shareholdings s of
workers
[
L̄
2
, L̄
2
+ 1
]
fulfill the conditions required in section 6.75
To simplify the presentation, we assume that all workers in
[
L̄
2
, L̄
2
+ 1
]
have the same
amount of shares s. Accordingly, if these workers prefer policy p1 to p2, at least half of
the electorate will have the same preference ordering. The single-crossing property of
the preferences of individuals
[
1, L̄
]
then implies the median voter theorem. The votes
of potential entrepreneurs in [0, 1] will not affect the outcome of any binary collective
decision p1 against p2.
A.2 Most-preferred policy of the median voter
In this section we consider the median voter’s problem and derive her most-preferred
policy. As described in the main text, we start with a given (τ, LB) and derive the
optimal choice of tP and tL. Then we elaborate on the desired levels of (τ, LB).
With τ given, we can replace tL by 1−(1−tP )/τ in expression (15) for the net transfers.
Then taking the derivative of the net transfers with respect to tP yields:
DNT :=
∂NT
∂tP
∣
∣
∣
∣
τ
= w
[
(
α
1− α
ly −ml)(1− s) + χ(LB)lE −
lE
τ
]
, (A.2)
where we use ly :=
Ly
L̄
, ml :=
m
L̄
, and lE :=
LE
L̄
to denote per-capita variables. Note that
with lump-sum transfers, a marginal increase in profit tax constitutes a redistribution
of profits (from entrepreneurs and the final-good firm) to workers, while an increase
74Note that if the worker with k = L̄2 prefers an entrepreneurial to a stagnant policy, all individuals
in
[
L̄
2 , L̄
]
will support the former.
75Even if collective decisions displayed cycles, these would remain in the set of most-preferred
policies for workers in
[
L̄
2 ,
L̄
2 + 1
]
.
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in the labor tax redistributes from workers to entrepreneurs.76 The redistribution of
profits is captured by the first two summands in (A.2). The first summand reflects
the additional redistribution of the final-good firm’s profits, the second represents the
additional redistribution of entrepreneurial profits. As the median voter is a worker,
she will prefer redistribution of entrepreneurial profits. Factor 1− s indicates that the
redistribution of the final-good firm’s profits is only favorable if she owns less than the
per-capita shares in the final-good firm. Finally, keeping τ constant, an increase in
the profit tax tP by a marginal unit must be matched by an increase in the labor tax
tL of 1/τ . The resulting amount of redistribution of labor income to entrepreneurs is
captured by the last summand in DNT .
If DNT is positive, net transfers for the median voter are maximized by the highest
possible profit tax rate, while the opposite is true if DNT is negative. However, the
optimal choice of tP (and tL) will depend on the particular value of τ . Table 2 shows
the optimal levels of tP and tL depending on DNT and τ . Note that since profits of
the final-good firm are non-negative (as w
(
α
1−α
ly −ml
)
≥ 0), the case where DNT < 0
and τ ≥ 1 can only occur if entrepreneurship is inefficient (i.e. χ(LB) < 1) and/or
s > 1.
Table 2: Median voter’s preferred labor and profit tax rates, given τ and LB
τ ≥ 1 τ < 1
DNT ≥ 0 tL = t , tL = 1− (1− t)/τ ,
tP = 1− τ(1 − t) tP = t
DNT < 0 tL = 1− (1− t)/τ , tL = t ,
tP = t tP = 1− τ(1− t)
We use t̃L(τ, LB) and t̃P (τ, LB) to refer to the optimal labor and profit tax rates for
given τ and LB. Using these tax rates, we can write the net transfers, and consequently
the median voter’s income, as a continuous function of τ and LB.
Lemma 3
Using t̃L(τ, LB) and t̃P (τ, LB), the median voter’s income is a continuous function of
(τ, LB) on [τ , τ ]× [0, L̄].
The proof is given in appendix B.6. Note that the median voter’s income is not
differentiable at the values of τ and LB where DNT = 0. With these results, we now
76The increase in labor tax does not per se constitute a redistribution towards the owners of the
shares of the final-good firm, as these are also either workers or entrepreneurs.
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move on to the second part of the median voter’s maximization problem concerning the
level of τ and the amount of basic research investments. Using Lemma 3, the median
voter will seek the maximum of a continuous function over a compact set. Hence,
by the Weierstrass extreme value theorem, the maximum will be attained in [τ , τ ] ×
[
0, L̄
]
. However, the set of maximizers may not be single-valued. For this purpose,
it is instructive to discuss some properties of the median voter’s income maximization
problem by approaching it in the two-step procedure used in the main text.
Consider the optimization of the median voter’s income (13) with respect to τ for given
basic research investments LB:
max
τ∈[τ ,τ ]
I(τ, LB) = w(τ, LB)
[
1 + s
(
α
1− α
ly(τ, LB)−ml
)]
+NT (τ, LB) . (A.3)
Regarding a marginal increase in τ at values of τ (and LB), where DNT 6= 0, the
median voter’s income is affected as follows:77
dI(τ, LB)
dτ
=
∂NT
∂t̃P
∂t̃P (τ, LB)
∂τ
+
∂NT
∂t̃L
∂t̃L(τ, LB)
∂τ
+
∂I(τ, LB)
∂lE
∂lE
∂τ
. (A.4)
Note that for an interior solution τ of the problem displayed in (A.3) dI(τ,LB)
dτ
must be
zero, if it is not equal to the critical values of τ associated with DNT = 0. An increase
in τ has two effects: it increases the relation between labor and profit taxes and it
(weakly) increases the number of entrepreneurs. The first two summands in (A.4) re-
flect the decline of redistribution from profits to labor income due to the comparatively
lower profit taxes. Note that one of the summands is zero, as either t̃P or t̃L remains
at the boundary of the feasible set [t, t]. The last term in (A.4) captures the effect of
an increase in the number of entrepreneurs on the median voter’s income.78 In the case
where entrepreneurship is efficient, i.e. χ(LB) > 1, an increase in entrepreneurship will
increase profits and total output but will lead to a lower wage rate. Consequently, a
median voter with a small amount of stocks faces the following trade-off regarding τ :
On the one hand, a marginally higher level of τ via a decline of tP will lower her gross
income (as the wage payments are the major income source) and lower the share of
profits redistributed.79 On the other, a larger τ will increase total output and with it
77Note that the terms ∂t̃P (τ,LB)
∂τ
and ∂t̃L(τ,LB)
∂τ
differ according to the different cases in Table 2. At
the critical values τc, as defined in the proof of Lemma 3, and τ = 1, equation (A.4) can still be used
when we refer to the right-sided derivatives.
78Note that for small values of LB and τ , LE will remain at zero in response to a marginal increase
in τ .
79Obviously, if τ is increased via an increase of tL rather than a decrease of tP , a higher share of
labor income is redistributed to entrepreneurs.
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the tax base for profit tax. This reflects a standard Laffer-curve trade-off.
As the set of maximizers may contain several values for τ , we cannot proceed as in
section 5.2 by defining a function τ(LB), inserting it back into the objective function,
and then solving for the optimal value of LB. Instead, we have to derive the correspon-
dence LB(τ) that maximizes the median voter’s income with respect to basic research
investments for a given level of τ . Optimal policy candidates for the median voter will
lie in the intersection between the two correspondences τ(LB) and LB(τ). Those with
the highest income level will then constitute the median voter’s preferred policies.
A.3 Details on the numerical illustration
We consider an economy with population L̄ = 20, which represents the total labor
force. To calibrate our model, we assume the following concave functional form for
η(LB): η(LB) = (LB/L̄)
β. For a complete numerical specification, five parameter
values need to be specified: α, β, γ, b, and m. We calibrate these parameters such that
an entrepreneurial economy with positive basic research and entrepreneurship exhibits
some average key characteristics of OECD member states observed from the data. We
start by requiring that total investments in basic research amount to a share of 0.33%
of GDP, which corresponds to the simple average of basic research intensities in OECD
member states.80 This yields the following condition:
(1− α)
LB
Ly
= 0.0033 . (A.5)
Next we turn our attention to entrepreneurship. In our model entrepreneurship is
innovative. We therefore choose LE according to:
LE = 0.0425L̄ , (A.6)
where 4.25% is the average share of the labor force engaged in opportunity-driven en-
trepreneurial activities.81 We combine these requirements with information on output
shares of intermediate goods and of labor to derive the standard production technology
for intermediates in our economy. In particular, we follow Jones (2011) in requiring
80Source: own calculations based on OECD (2012). The data refers to centered 5-year moving
averages in 2005 and was downloaded in June 2013.
81Source: own calculations based on Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2013). The data refers to
centered 5-year moving averages in 2006. The definition by GEM: ‘improvement-driven opportunity
entrepreneurial activity’. The data was downloaded in July 2013.
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that in our entrepreneurial economy the output share of intermediates be 0.5. With all
intermediates selling at price p(i) = mw, this corresponds to the following condition:
(1− α)
m
Ly
= 0.5 . (A.7)
Concerning labor income shares, we refer to data provided by the EU KLEMS project
and require that:82,83
(1− α)
Ly + Lx + LB
Ly + (1− α)LB
= 0.628 . (A.8)
From the labor market clearing condition we obtain:
Ly + Lx + LB = L̄− LE .
Combining this result with equations (A.5) to (A.8) and solving for m, yields:
m ≈ 15.2 .
Next we require that output in the entrepreneurial economy be 5.7% larger than in the
stagnant economy:84
[
Ly
L̄−m
]1−α
= 1.057 . (A.9)
From equation (A.7) we can replace Ly by 2m(1− α), yielding:
[
2(1− α)m
L̄−m
]1−α
= 1.057 .
With the solution for m given above, we can solve this equation numerically for α to
obtain:
α ≈ 0.79 .
We now turn to b, β, and γ, the parameters characterizing entrepreneurship and inno-
vation in our economy. We need three conditions to calibrate these parameters. An
82Source: own calculations based on EU KLEMS (2011). The value of 0.628 is the average la-
bor income share in OECD countries considered in the EU KLEMS database in year 2005 (cen-
tered 5-year moving averages have been used). The labor income share has been computed as
labor compensation
labor compensation + capital compensation . The data was downloaded in July 2013.
83To mimic labor shares observed from the data, we add basic research investments to both labor
income and final-good production when computing the labor share in our model, as basic research
represents government expenditures. We note that using the labor share in the private sector alone,
w[Ly+Lx]
y
, would yield a very similar calibration.
84A 5.7% increase corresponds to the average total factor productivity growth for the OECD mem-
bers included in the EU KLEMS database for the period 1996 to 2006. Source: own calculations
based on EU KLEMS 2011. The data was downloaded in July 2013.
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initial condition follows directly from the use of our previously derived results in the
labor market clearing condition:
Ly = L̄− LB −m+ LE [χ(LB)− 1] . (A.10)
With the previous parameter values, this condition pins down the expected amount of
labor savings by an additional entrepreneur, χ(LB). Setting τ = 1.01, which is in line
with effective tax rates for OECD member countries,85 we obtain the value for b ≈ 2.31
from the equilibrium condition for LE :
86
LE = 1−
1
τχ(LB)b
. (A.11)
Finally, we have to specify β and γ. Those parameter values are calculated to match
both the value of χ(LB) derived previously and empirical evidence on mark-ups pre-
sented by Roeger (1995) and Martins et al. (1996). In line with this evidence, we
require intermediate-good producers to charge on average a mark-up of 1.2, i.e. we
require:
1
γ
LEη(LB) = 1.2 .
This gives us the values γ ≈ 0.16 and β ≈ 0.28.
A.4 Constitutional design
In this part of the appendix, we discuss constitutional design behind the veil of ig-
norance. Specifically, suppose that households decide on t without knowing their in-
dividual shareholdings but only the distribution from which these shareholdings will
be drawn. This distribution is the same for all households, i.e. households own the
per-capita shares in expectation. For simplicity, suppose further that they are aware of
their immaterial utilities from being an entrepreneur. Let L̄ > 2, i.e. let the majority
of the population be workers. Then workers will choose t to maximize their expected
income under the policy preferred by the median voter.87 As before, let s < 1, i.e.
after the veil of ignorance has been resolved the median voter owns less than the per-
capita shares. Then ex-ante workers will not care about the distribution of final-good
85Source: own calculations based on Djankov et al. (2010). The data was downloaded in April 2014.
86Note that this value for b implies that the aggregate immaterial utility from being an entrepreneur
is positive, i.e. that, on average, entrepreneurs like being entrepreneurs, although some entrepreneurs
dislike being entrepreneurs, in line with empirical evidence previously cited (cf. footnote 17).
87Recall that households are risk-neutral.
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producer’s profits, only about aggregate income and the distribution thereof between
workers and entrepreneurs. By contrast, the ex-post median voter will also care about
distribution of final-good producer’s profits. In essence, agents with (expected) s = 1
set t to guide the subsequent policy choice by a median voter with s < 1. In principle,
we have to distinguish two cases, depending on whether or not the median voter with
s ≤ 1 can earn ȳopt, the per-capita income in the output-maximizing entrepreneurial
economy, or even more. We limit our attention to the more realistic case where this is
not feasible.88
Suppose t is chosen arbitrarily close to 1 at the constitutional stage, i.e. t = 1 − ε
for some arbitrarily small ε > 0. Then, by choosing tL, tP arbitrarily close to 1 with
tL > tP , the ex-post median voter can earn an income that is arbitrarily close to
ȳopt. Given that it is not possible for her to earn ȳopt, she will implement this policy.
This is ex-ante desired by the worker as it maximizes the cake and fully redistributes
entrepreneurial profits. We conclude that in the constitutional design phase workers
will choose t = 1− ε, the largest possible upper bound on taxation. As in Proposition
4, choosing t = 1 − ε helps resolve the conflict between efficiency and equality. For
t = 1−ε, the higher redistribution incentive for a voter with s < 1 will not compromise
efficiency.89 The optimality of maximal constitutional freedom for tax policies adds a
new perspective to the literature, which has hitherto emphasized constitutional tax
constraints.90
88If the median voter owns less than the per-capita shares of the final-good producer, she can only
receive an income of ȳopt or more if entrepreneurs receive less income than workers on average (she
can never have an income exceeding the average worker’s income). Formally, we must have (1 −
tP )χ(LB)w < (1− tL)w, i.e. entrepreneurs are taxed sufficiently more heavily than workers such that
net income is redistributed from entrepreneurs to workers. With χ(LB) > 1 in any growth-oriented
entrepreneurial economy, this requires τ < 1, i.e. tax policies dis-incentivize entrepreneurship, so this
economy is inefficient when compared to the output-maximizing economy yielding ȳopt. Hence, for the
median voter to receive income larger than ȳopt, the redistribution of net income from entrepreneurs
to workers must be large enough to overcompensate for the loss in efficiency arising from the decrease
in productive entrepreneurship due to τ < 1. If b is very large, this is possible in principle, as then
the decrease in τ has only a small negative effect on entrepreneurship. However, this may not be the
most realistic scenario, and we therefore ignore it here.
89Note that this rationale also implies that in the constitutional design phase workers will choose
t = 1 − ε, the largest possible upper bound on taxation. The lower t is, the more the median voter
will compromise efficiency for more redistribution of the (final-good producer’s) profits in her optimal
policy choice.
90Cf. Brennan and Buchanan (1977) and Gradstein (1999) and the discussion in section 2. Note,
however, that in our model t = 1 − ε is no longer optimal in general if the ex-post median voter can
receive income larger than ȳopt or if she holds s shares with s > 1. Then the median voter’s ex-post
interest in the redistribution of final-good producers’ profits is different from the optimal solution for a
worker with s = 1. Similarly, additional effects have to be taken into account if entrepreneurial talent
is also behind the veil of ignorance in the constitutional stage. In this case, households care about
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B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed in three steps: We first derive two preliminary results and then prove
Proposition 1.
First, considering the equilibrium in the market for intermediate goods for the case of
positive production in the final-good sector, we can state:
Lemma 4
(i) In any equilibrium with positive production in the final-good sector, intermediate-
good producers supplying their product will charge p(i) = mw.91
(ii) In any equilibrium with positive production in the final-good sector, the final-
good producer will use all varieties of intermediate goods.
Proof: We prove each part of Lemma 4 separately.
(i) We consider innovative and non-innovative intermediate-good producers separately.
Intermediate goods in non-innovative industries are produced using the freely available
standard technology. Perfect competition implies that these intermediate goods are
sold at marginal cost in equilibrium, i.e. non-innovative intermediate-good producers
will offer their goods at price p(i) = mw.
The production costs of innovative intermediate-good producers are reduced to γmw.
These firms are still confronted with competition from non-innovative intermediate-
good producers in their industry. Taken together, this implies that an innovative
intermediate-good producer will charge a price p(i) = δimw with δi ∈ [γ, 1]. We show
by contradiction that δi ∈ [γ, 1) cannot be optimal. In particular, we show that no
symmetric equilibria exist in which all innovative intermediate-good producers charge
the common price p(i) = δmw, with δ ∈ [γ, 1).92
maximizing aggregate welfare including the immaterial costs and benefits of being an entrepreneur (cf.
appendix A.2 of Gersbach et al. (2014) and the discussion in section 7.) when choosing t. Depending
on parameter values, t = 1− ε may or may not be optimal in this case.
91To avoid needing to discretize the strategy space in order to obtain the existence of equilibria in
the price-setting game in the intermediate-good industry i, we assume as a tie-breaking rule that the
final-good producer demands the product from the innovating entrepreneur if he offers the same price
as non-innovating competitors.
92It is straightforward to verify that no non-symmetric equilibrium exists with δi < 1 for any value
of i.
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Let us define X̃ :=
∫
i|p(i)=δmw
x(i)αdi and X̂ :=
∫
i|p(i)=mw
x(i)αdi. This enables us to
write the maximization problem of the final-good producer as:
max
Ly ,{x(i)}
1
i=0
πy = L
1−α
y (X̃ + X̂)− wLy − δmwX̃ −mwX̂
= X̃(L1−αy − δmw) + X̂(L
1−α
y −mw)− wLy . (B.1)
As δ < 1, L1−αy − δmw > 0 is a necessary condition for non-negative profits for the
final-good producer with positive output. L1−αy − δmw is the net marginal benefit of
the final-good producer from using intermediate good x(i) offered at price p(i) = δmw
in production. Hence L1−αy − δmw > 0 implies first that if the final-good producer
is operating, he will always demand x(i) = 1 of every intermediate offered at price
p(i) = δmw, and second, that the innovative intermediate-good producer i would want
to set a price p̃(i) = δmw + ǫ, ǫ > 0 but small, such that L1−αy − p̃(i) > 0. Then the
net marginal benefit of the final-good producer from using intermediate good x(i) in
production remains positive. Furthermore, given that each intermediate-good producer
has measure 0, it would not affect the profitability of the representative final-good firm.
Hence the final-good firm would still demand x(i) = 1, a contradiction to p(i) = δmw
being profit-maximizing for intermediate-good producer i.
The contradiction establishes the result.
(ii) Let us define X :=
∫ 1
0
x(i)αdi. X assumes the value 0 if x(i) = 0 ∀ i, 1 if x(i) = 1 ∀ i,
and values between 0 and 1 only if a subset of the varieties is used. If p(i) = mw ∀ i,
the maximization problem of the final-good producer can be written as:
max
Ly ,X
πy = L
1−α
y X − wLy −mwX = X(L
1−α
y −mw)− wLy . (B.2)
Hence the profit function is linear in X. A necessary condition for non-negative profits
is L1−αy − mw > 0. Hence X = 1 is profit-maximizing if the final-good producer is
operating.
✷
Second, the indivisibility of intermediates implies that the final-good producer will not
always be able to break even:
Lemma 5
The final good producer will be able to break even with strictly positive production if
and only if governmental policy (τ, LB) satisfies the following Positive Profit Condition
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(PPC):
m
α
≤
{
L̄− LB if
1
τχ(LB)b
≥ 1
L̄− LB +
[
1− 1
τχ(LB)b
]
[χ(LB)− 1] if
1
τχ(LB)b
< 1
. (PPC)
Proof: We can use the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs (6) and labor in
intermediate-good production (8) together with the market clearing condition in the
labor market:
L̄ = LeE + LB + L
e
y + L
e
x (B.3)
to derive the number of workers employed in the final-good sector in an equilibrium
with positive final-good production:
Ley = L̄− LB − L
e
E − L
e
x . (B.4)
Equation (3) yields the corresponding equilibrium wage rate as:
we = (1− α)(L̄− LB − L
e
E − L
e
x)
−α . (B.5)
Using the profit function (2) and Lemma 4, we obtain equilibrium profits in the final-
good sector:
πey = (L
e
y)
1−α − weLey − w
em .
Inserting the equilibrium wage rate (B.5) yields:
πey = α(L
e
y)
1−α − (1− α)m(Ley)
−α. (B.6)
We observe that the final-good firm’s profit strictly increases in the amount of labor
it employs in equilibrium.93 Consequently, according to (B.6), the final-good firm’s
profits will be positive if the amount of labor employed in final-good production exceeds
the critical level, Lcy := m
1−α
α
. Combining this result with (6), (8), and (B.4) yields
condition (PPC).
✷
Now we can prove Proposition 1. From Lemmas 4 and 5 we know that, if condition
(PPC) is satisfied, the final-good producer is operating and using all varieties of the
intermediate goods in production. Conversely, if condition (PPC) is not satisfied, he is
93This is very intuitive, as higher employment in final-good production yields higher output and
this is associated with lower wages in equilibrium, implying that the prices of both the inputs labor
and intermediate goods are lower.
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not operating. From this follows LeE = L
e
x = L
e
y = 0 and zero profits. We now need to
show that in case (i) the other variables take on the unique equilibrium values stated
in the Proposition.
(i) Conditions (1) and (2) have been derived in the main text. Condition (3) follows
from using LeE and L
e
x in the labor market clearing condition, and condition (4) from
equation (B.5)) above. Combining we with the observation that p(i) = mw ∀ i yields
condition (5). Condition (6) follows from x(i) = 1 ∀ i and the production technology
in the final-good sector. Condition (7) has been derived above. Finally, condition (8)
follows from using we in the expression for profits of a monopolistic intermediate-good
producer.
✷
B.2 Proof of Corollary 1
By Proposition 3 there will be an entrepreneurial economy if and only if condition
(PLS) is satisfied. In response to a change in m, b, τ , or γ, the government could
leave L̃B(τ) unaffected. Hence, if it opts for a
ˆ̃LB(τ) 6= L̃B(τ), then we must have
c
(
τ , ˆ̃LB(τ)
)
≥ c
(
τ , L̃B(τ)
)
, which implies:
− ˆ̃LB(τ ) +

1−
1
τχ
(
ˆ̃LB(τ )
)
b


[
χ
(
ˆ̃LB(τ)
)
− 1
]
≥
− L̃B(τ ) +

1−
1
τχ
(
L̃B(τ )
)
b


[
χ
(
L̃B(τ)
)
− 1
]
.
A proof then follows from the fact that for a given L̃B(τ):

1−
1
τχ
(
L̃B(τ)
)
b


[
χ
(
L̃B(τ)
)
− 1
]
is increasing in m, b, and τ and decreasing in γ as χ
(
L̃B (τ )
)
= m(1 − γ)η
(
L̃B (τ)
)
.
✷
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
By using (3), (4), and (6) from Proposition 1(i), income per capita can be written as:
ȳ :=
y
L̄
= w
[
1 +
α
1− α
ly −ml + lE(χ(LB)− 1)− lB
]
, (B.7)
where we use ly :=
Ly
L̄
, ml :=
m
L̄
, and lE :=
LE
L̄
to denote per-capita variables. In the
stagnant economy, this reduces to:
ȳS =
yS
L̄
= wS
[
1 +
α
1− α
lSy −ml
]
, (B.8)
where we use a superscript S to denote variable values in the stagnant economy. Sub-
stituting (15) in (13), the value of the median voter’s income is:
I = w
[
1 + (
α
1− α
ly −ml)(s+ tP (1− s)) + lE(tPχ(LB)− tL)− lB
]
,
which reduces to:
IS = wS
[
1 +
(
α
1− α
lSy −ml
)
(s+ tSP (1− s))
]
in the stagnant economy. Due to the assumption s < 1, the median voter maximally
redistributes profits tSP = t in the stagnant economy.
94
Consider any policy (τ̂ , L̂B) for which ˆ̄y > ȳ
S (such a policy necessarily implies L̂B > 0
and L̂E > 0). With s < 1, we have a condition where I
S ≤ ȳS. Hence it suffices to
show that for (τ̂ , L̂B) we can find a t such that Î > ȳ
S. Note that limtP→1,tl→1 Î = ˆ̄y.
Since ˆ̄y > ȳS, the assertion of Proposition 4 follows from the fact that for any δ > 0
we can find a pair (tP , tL) ≪ (1, 1) yielding τ̂ and satisfying ˆ̄y − Î ≤ δ.
✷
B.4 Proof of Proposition 5
To show the result, note first that the restriction s ≤ L̄
L̄+(1−γ)m
is a sufficient condition
for the derivative of the median voter’s gross income with respect to Ly to be negative.
In particular, this will be the case for all Ly s.t. s
[
Ly+m
L̄
]
< 1, and the restriction on
94Note that labor tax does not affect the median voter’s income in the stagnant economy as all
individuals are workers. The population only differs with respect to their shareholdings in the final-
good firm.
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s follows from rearranging terms and from observing that Ly is strictly bounded from
above by L̄− γm.
Now suppose that t = 0. Then the median voter’s income corresponds to her gross
income minus her share of the cost involved in providing basic research. In such
circumstances, she will strictly prefer the stagnant economy over the entrepreneurial
economy.95 The result then follows from the continuity of the median voter’s income,
implying that she will also prefer the stagnant economy for sufficiently small t > 0.
✷
B.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Fix any entrepreneurial policy (τ̂ , L̂B) with L̂y > L
S
y . From Proposition 4 we know
that for t = 1− ε, the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. τ̂ ∈ [τ , τ ],
2. the median voter with s ≤ L̄
L̄+(1−γ)m
will prefer the entrepreneurial policy (τ̂ , L̂B)
over the stagnant economy.
From Proposition 5 we know that for t small the median voter supports the stagnant
economy, implying that at least one of the two conditions above is no longer satisfied.
Accordingly, it remains to be shown that for every entrepreneurial policy (τ̂ , L̂B) there
exists a unique threshold level tc such that both conditions above are satisfied if and
only if t ≥ tc.
For every τ̂ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a unique t
1
c such that τ̂ ∈ [τ , τ ] if and only if t ≥ t
1
c .
Hence we can limit our attention to t ≥ t
1
c , and the result follows if we can show that
Î − IS is monotonic in t.96 Note that a decrease in t such that t ≥ t
1
c will only change
net transfers but not the median voter’s gross income. Thus we can limit our attention
to the derivative of NT with respect to t for τ̂ and L̂B given. In the stagnant economy
we have:97
∂NT S
∂t
= wS
[(
α
1− α
lSy −ml
)
(1− s)
]
≥ 0 .
95Note that in the entrepreneurial economy Ly ≥ L
S
y and LB > 0.
96As we show below, Î − IS can be monotonically increasing or decreasing. Obviously, if it is
monotonically decreasing then we must have tc = t
1
c .
97Note that we always have 1 ∈ [τ, τ ]. Hence, by Assumption 2, the stagnant economy is always
feasible, irrespective of t.
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Note that ∂NT
S
∂t
is constant. The monotonicity of Î − IS then follows from ∂NT
∂t
∣
∣
τ̂
L̂B
t≥t
1
c
being constant as well. We will show that this holds for each of the four cases outlined
in Table 2 of appendix A.2.
DNT < 0, τ̂ ≥ 1 Not possible as L̂y ≥ L
S
y implies χ(L̂B) > 1 and s ≤
L̄
L̄+(1−γ)m
<
1.
DNT < 0, τ̂ < 1 The median voter optimally chooses t̂L = t = 0 and t̂P = 1 − τ̂
implying that:
∂NT
∂t
∣
∣
∣
∣
τ̂
L̂B
t≥t
1
c
= 0 ,
so Î − IS is monotonically decreasing in t.98
DNT ≥ 0, τ̂ ≥ 1 The median voter optimally chooses t̂L = t and t̂P = 1− τ̂(1− t).
Hence the derivative of net transfers in the entrepreneurial economy with respect to t
writes:
∂NT
∂t
∣
∣
∣
∣
τ̂
L̂B
t≥t
1
c
= ŵ
[
τ̂
(
(
α
1− α
l̂y −ml)(1− s) + χ(L̂B)l̂E
)
− l̂E
]
,
which is constant, implying that Î − IS is monotonic in t.99
DNT ≥ 0, τ̂ < 1 The median voter optimally chooses t̂L = 1−(1−t)/τ̂ and t̂P = t,
yielding the following derivative of net transfers in the entrepreneurial economy:
∂NT
∂t
∣
∣
∣
∣
τ̂
L̂B
t≥t
1
c
= ŵ
[
(
α
1− α
l̂y −ml
)
(1− s) + χ(L̂B)l̂E −
l̂E
τ̂
]
.
Again, ∂NT
∂t
∣
∣
τ̂
L̂B
t≥t
1
c
is constant, implying that Î − IS is monotonic in t.
✷
B.6 Proof of Lemma 3
We first show the continuity of the median voter’s income I with respect to τ , for given
LB, and then the continuity of I with respect to LB, for given τ .
98Note that ∂NT
∂t
∣
∣
τ̂
L̂B
t≥t
1
c
= 0, ∂NT
S
∂t
≥ 0 and Proposition 4 imply that in the case considered here the
median voter will prefer the entrepreneurial economy over the stagnant economy whenever both are
feasible, i.e. we have tc = t
1
c = 1− τ̂ .
99In fact, we have tc > t
1
c . This follows from tP = 0 and hence NT < 0 for τ̂ = τ . Note that this
also implies that Î − IS is monotonically increasing.
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(1) Since the median voter’s gross income is a continuous function of τ and LB, it is
sufficient to focus on net transfers NT (τ, LB).
(2) We use Table 2, which describes optimal labor and profit taxes for given (τ, LB).
We observe that the net transfers are continuous within each of the different subsets
of (τ, LB) defined by the four different cases. Potential discontinuities may exist at
the transitions from one case to another. In this respect, we define the critical values
τ c(LB) and L
c
B(τ) by DNT (τ
c, LB) = 0 for a given LB in the feasible set and by
DNT (τ, LcB) = 0 for a given τ , respectively.
(3) As can be observed from Table 2, there are two critical values of τ for a given
LB: τ
c(LB) and τ = 1. The former is only interesting if τ
c(LB) ∈ [τ , τ ], while by our
assumptions in section 4 the latter will always be in the feasible set. Now consider any
two sequences {τm} and {τn} with limm→∞ τm = τ
c, τm ≤ τ
c, and limn→∞ τn = τ
c,
τn ≥ τ
c. As DNT (τ c, LB) = 0 means that a change in tax rates tP , tL does not
affect net transfers [NT (τ c, LB)] as long as τ
c remains unchanged, we must obtain
limm→∞NT (τm, LB) = limn→∞NT (τn, LB). Hence, NT (τ, LB) is continuous at τ
c for
a given LB.
(4) At the critical value τ = 1, both tax rates tP and tL are identical. Consequently,
for two sequences with limm→∞ τm = 1, τm ≤ 1, and limn→∞ τn = 1, τn ≥ 1, we also
obtain limm→∞ NT (τm, LB) = limn→∞NT (τn, LB) = NT (1, LB). Thus, net transfers
are continuous in τ at τ = 1.
(5) We can use the same argument as in (3) with respect to sequences {LB,m} and
{LB,n} with limit L
c
B for given τ to establish continuity of I with respect to LB.
✷
C Data Overview
In this section we provide the data for all the OECD countries. As mentioned in the
main text we chose the year 2013 to give a recent account and for maximal data avail-
ability. If no data was available for 2013, we provide the last available data point.
Unfortunately, some countries have not provided any data on basic research expendi-
tures for more than 20 years or didn’t provide any data on this measure at all.
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Table 3: Data Overviewa
Basic research
exp. as perc. of
GDPb
Corporate in-
come tax ratesc
Income tax rates
at average wagesc
Australia 0.45d 30.0 23.1
Austria 0.56 25.0 34.4
Belgium 0.49 33.0 33.7
Canada N/A 15.0 18.4
Chile 0.11 20.0 7.0
Czech Republic 0.66 19.0 14.6
Denmark 0.54 25.0 32.2
Estonia 0.37 21.0 16.4
Finland N/A 24.5 30.1
France 0.54 38.0 22.7
Germany N/A 15.8 31.4
Greece 0.28 26.0 26.9
Hungary 0.23 19.0 34.5
Iceland 0.46 20.0 20.3
Ireland 0.30 12.5 14.3
Israel 0.40 25.0 16.4
Italy 0.33 27.5 28.8
Japan 0.44 28.1 20.0
Korea 0.75 22.0 12.9
Latvia 0.15 15.0 N/A
Luxembourg N/A 22.5 18.2
Mexico 0.14 30.0 9.8
Netherlands 0.55 25.0 28.4
New Zealand 0.29 28.0 16.9
Norway 0.29 28.0 26.7
Poland 0.23 19.0 20.8
Portugal 0.28 30.0 19.7
Slovak Republic 0.31 23.0 15.7
Slowenia 0.31 17.0 29.4
Spain 0.27 30.0 19.0
Sweden N/A 22.0 25.1
Switzerland 0.90e 8.5 14.0
Turkey N/A 20.0 26.3
United Kingdom 0.20 21.0 24.0
United States 0.48 35.0 20.6
Average 0.37 23.5 22.1
a All data is from the year 2013 if not noted otherwise.
b Source: OECD (2016a).
c Source: OECD (2016b).
d Data from 2008.
e Data from 2012.
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